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TIES THAT BIND?
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA,
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE
REVISION OF CANADIAN CRIMINAL
LAW UNDER THE CHARTER°
By ROBERT HARVIE* AND HAMAR FOSTER**
Chief Justice Dickson has suggested that Canadian jurists should consult
American authority in Charter cases, but with care. The authors look at
how the Court has followed this advice in its own criminal decisions
rendered prior to March 1989, in which American authority is cited in
less than 50 percent of the cases. The authors conclude that, in some
significant areas, the Court has interpreted the interests of the accused
more broadly than the American Supreme Court does and has on
occasion done so without citing divergent U.S. precedent. The effect of
sections 1 and 24(2) of the Charter on this trend remain to be seen.
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Since the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,1 Canadians have had to get used to a phenomenon that
Americans have lived with for some time: judicial review of both
legislation and official action for compliance with constitutional
rights. Between 1867 and 1982, Canadian judges presiding at
criminal trials had virtually no authority to remedy rights violations
by police or prosecutors. The only ground for striking down
legislation, criminal or otherwise, was that it had been enacted by
the wrong level of government.2 Thus, courts could neither exclude
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 The Constitution Act; 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (formerly British North America
Act, 1867) divided legislative jurisdiction between the Dominion parliament and the provincial
legislatures, each of which had plenary authority within its respective realm. The law of
evidence provided that so long as evidence was relevant and was not excluded by any common
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evidence obtained as a result of such violations, nor hold a law ultra
vires for any reason other than a breach of the federal principle.
This led, over the years, to a number of rather strained decisions in
which the courts were obliged to resolve civil liberties issues using
only the language of federalism. 3  Eventually, the artificiality of this
prompted some judges to speak of an "implied Bill of Rights" in the
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867.4 This led to the passage of
the Canadian Bill of Rights, an ordinary federal statute, in 1960.
5
While the Supreme Court ruled in the well-known case of R. v.
Dlybones that it could now declare legislation inconsistent with the
Bill inoperative, it subsequently proved extremely reluctant to do so.6
Yet, Diybones was never explicitly overruled. This important phase
of Canadian judicial history may have influenced the present
Supreme Court's much more activist stance.
7
law or statutory rule, it was admissible, however obtained. The only remedy available to
judges who felt that an impropriety had occurred was the rather nebulous and uncertain one
of staying a prosecution on the ground that the judicial process was being abused. In 1977,
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled (5:4) that even this power probably did not exist. See
Rourke v. R (1977), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1021, 35 C.C.C. (2d) 129.
3 For example, in cases such as Saunur v. Quebec (City of), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 and
Switznan v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285, the Supreme Court struck down laws that interfered
with freedom of speech and religion under the guise of holding that they trenched upon
federal legislative authority. Thus, in Switzman, a Quebec law which prohibited using a house
"to propagate communism or bolshevism" was held ultra vires because it was criminal and,
therefore, federal in nature. The implication, of course, was that rights could be limited (or
even abrogated) so long as the right level of government did so. Usually, the provinces
argued that they had jurisdiction over this sort of case by virtue of their authority over
property and civil rights, conferred by section 92(13) of the Constitution Ac; 1867.
4 See Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100.
5 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1970, App. III.
6 R. v. Drbones (1969), [1970] S.C.R. 282, 3 C.C.C. 355 [hereinafter Drybones cited to
C.C.C.].
7 In the twenty-two years between the passage of the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960 and
the Charter in 1982, Drybones, supra, note 6 was the only case in which the Supreme Court
invalidated a statutory provision (a section of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 149) for violating
the Bill. This "fact of Canadian judicial history" was the subject of comment in the Supreme
Court's first right to counsel case under the Charter. See infra, note 177 and accompanying
text at 760.
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In the criminal sphere, cases invalidating federal law were
especially rare. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down
a provision of the Criminal Code8 only once prior to 1982. But,
since then, the change has been remarkable, both within the criminal
sphere and without it. When Baar compared the Canadian and
United States Supreme Courts' rights record thirteen years ago, he
found that, in the two decades following 1950, the United States
Court invalidated public action in 56.3% of its constitutional cases,
whereas the Canadian Court did so in only 25.9%. Yet, Morton
and Withey note that the Canadian Court's record in Charter cases
between 1982 and 1985 is 58%, a figure "identical with the earlier
figure for its American counterpart and more than double its own
earlier mark."10 In the criminal area alone, the Supreme Court has,
in the past five years, relied upon sections 7 and 11(d) of the
Charter to strike down two important sections of the Criminal Code.
Further, a number of other provisions, including a common law rule
or two, are in jeopardy1 Just as important, by providing that
8 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
9 Boggs v. R, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 49, 58 C.C.C. (2d) 7. However, on occasion the Court
struck down provisions in other federal statutes on the ground that they trenched upon
provincial legislative powers, even when the Dominion attempted to defend them as coming
within its extensive criminal jurisdiction. See, for example, Reference Re Validity of Section
5(a) of the Diary Industy Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1, upheld by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. A.G. Quebec (1950), [1951] A.C. 179.
1 0 See F.L. Morton & MJ. Withey, Charting the Charter, 1982-1985 A StatisticalAnalysis
(Calgary: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Calgary, 1986) referring to Baar's work
at 79-80. Although the rate plotted by Morton and Withey has since declined somewhat, it
is notable that in a randomly selected ten volumes of criminal cases reported in 1987-89
(Volumes 33 through 43, Canadian Criminal Cases, Third Series), approximately 50% are
Charter cases. In the ten corresponding volumes from 1977-79 (Volumes 33 through 43,
Canadian Criminal Cases, Second Series), constitutional and civil liberties cases are far fewer
in number. Volume 34 is typical. In it there are four cases listed under civil rights and
constitutional law in the Second Series (1977), compared to 30 in the Third (1987).
11 In R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449 [hereinafter Morgentaler
cited to C.C.C.], the Court struck down what was then section 251 of the Criminal Code, the
abortion law, as violating the right of women to security of the person under section 7 of the
Charter. In Vaillancourt v. R, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118 [hereinafter
Vaillencourt cited to C.C.C.], it invalidated what was then section 213(d), the felony-murder
rule, because of a conflict with section 7 and the presumption of innocence in section 11(d).
The Court suggested that other provisions that permitted a conviction for murder without
requiring the prosecution to prove subjective foresight were also bad. See section III.D., infra
at 769ff. Then, in R v. Bernard, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833, 45 CC.C. (3d) 1, a plurality even cast
732
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evidence obtained in violation of the Charter must be excluded if
its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute,
section 24(2) has meant that police behaviour, found wanting in this
sense, may now give rise to a remedy that effectively checkmates the
prosecution.
12
To American lawyers, this might seem like a predictable trend.
However, the Supreme Court's conservative approach to the 1960
Bill of Rights led many Canadian observers to expect a similar
judicial response to the Charter. One factor that militated against
such a repeat of the past is terminology. The pre-1982 rhetoric of
the "rights of the public" as something to be weighed against the
"rights of the accused" has been undermined by the Charter, which
classifies only the interests of the accused as "rights." The interests
of the wider society appear as limits on those rights, imposed either
by judicial interpretation (section 1) or legislative decree (section
33).13 The Charter therefore represents a move away from the
modified Toryism of the past, in which the interests of neither the
community nor the accused were theoretically paramount, towards
a more classically liberal regime. In practical terms, these changes
doubt upon the common law restriction of the intoxication defence in prosecutions for general
intent offences.
12 Section 24(1) authorizes courts to grant any remedy that is "appropriate and just in
the circumstances" to anyone whose Charter rights have been violated. Section 24(2) requires
a court to exclude evidence obtained "in a manner that infringed or denied" Charter rights, if
it concludes that to admit it would "bring the administration of justice into disrepute." The
leading Supreme Court case on this provision is Collins v. R, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 33 C.C.C.
(3d) 1 [hereinafter Collins cited to C.C.C.]. Notwithstanding that the Court concluded that
real evidence obtained by contravening section 8 will "rarely" operate so unfairly as to require
exclusion, it indicated that narcotics obtained during an unreasonable search involving a
throat-hold would be excluded. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the rule was not
to discipline the police, but to prevent the administration of justice from being tarnished. It
has also rehabilitated the "abuse of process" jurisdiction referred to supra, note 2, especially
in entrapment cases. See, for example, Amato v. R, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 418, 69 C.C.C. (2d) 31;
A. v. Jewitt (1983), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128, 21 C.C.C. (3d) 7; R v. Keyowski, [1988] 1 S.C.R.
657, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 481; R v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903, 44 C.C.C. (3d) 513 [hereinafter
Mack cited to C.C.C.].
13 Section 1 provides that the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter are subject to
"such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." Section 33 permits Parliament or a provincial legislature to declare that
a law "shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15" of
the Charter. Such declarations need to be renewed after five years.
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have meant that the Canadian criminal process has finally become
"an appropriate forum for correcting its own abuses."14
It should not be surprising, therefore, that a debate familiar to
Americans has taken shape in Canada. It is a debate about the
extent to which the Supreme Court's interpretation of these new
powers was intended, or at least anticipated, by the framers of the
new constitution (who are still very much alive and willing to talk).,5
However, what is just a little surprising is that, quite early in the
process, the Supreme Court of Canada announced that it would be
in no way bound or influenced by contemporaneous declarations of
intent and acted accordingly.16  Even more surprising - at least to
us - is that, on occasion, the Court has gone even farther than its
United States counterpart towards a due process model of criminal
justice.
17
One of us is American and is familiar and comfortable with
"rights review" of criminal legislation and police practices; the other
is Canadian and is less familiar and less comfortable. But neither of
us expected that we would find, in cases involving issues such as the
use of an accused's prior testimony, the seizure of blood samples,
the right to counsel at line-ups and traffic stops, and even the
substantive definitions of offences and defences, that the Supreme
Court of Canada now protects the interests of the accused more
vigorously than its American counterpart. Moreover, this contrast
14 The phrase is H.L. Packer's, from his The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1968) at 167. In it, Packer contrasts the "law enforcement" and
"due process" models of the criminal process.
15 In "More on Miranda - Recent Developments Under Subsection 10(b) of the Charter"
[1987] Ottawa L. Rev. 573 at 580, D.M. Paciocco argues that, although it is "doubtful that
many anticipated this result ... Miranda-like doctrines" are a product of the
"constitutionalization of basic criminal law principles and are "the legitimate progeny of the
accusatorial system that Canada shares with the United States." In what follows, we hope
to show that, in some important respects, the Supreme Court of Canada has even out-
Mirandized - Miranda, legitimately or not.
16 See the reasons of Justice Lamer, for the majority, in Reference Re Section 94(2) of
the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at 306-7 [hereinafter Motor
Vehicle Reference cited to C.C.C.]. See also 3. Cameron, "'The Motor Vehicle Reference and
the Relevance of American Doctrine in Charter Adjudication" in R. Sharpe, ed., Charter
Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) at 69-96.
17 Packer, supra, note 14, c. 8.
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seems due as much to the wording of the Charter and the
philosophy and approach of the Supreme Court of Canada as to the
conservative trend that many commentators believe has been
operative in the United States Supreme Court recently.
1 8
To do justice to this phenomenon would require a book, rather
than an article. Indeed, a satisfactory comparative treatment of the
two countries' exclusionary rules would require an article in itself.
We therefore decided to address only two aspects of the topic -
one quantitative, the other qualitative - and only in the most
preliminary and exploratory fashion. The first and more
straightforward of the two is the extent to which the Supreme Court
of Canada has referred to United States precedent in its criminal
decisions. This is dealt with in Section II and is based upon a
survey of all the Court's criminal Charter cases to date. The second
is how the Court has used - or not used - this precedent to analyze
a number of issues affecting the rights of the accused that lawyers, in
both countries, see as among the most basic. This is dealt with in
Section III by focusing on about a dozen or so Supreme Court of
Canada decisions and by comparing these to relevant United States
precedent, whether referred to by the Court or not.
I. UNITED STATES AUTHORITY IN CANADIAN SUPREME
COURT CHARTER CASES
The Supreme Court of Canada's attitude to the use of United
States precedent in Canadian constitutional cases has, traditionally,
been a suspicious one. In the past, counsel who cited it were often
met with the airy assertion that such material was of limited
18 See, for example, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) establishing the "public
safety' exception to Miranda; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) [hereinafter Leon],
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), and inois v. Kru!!, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)
establishing the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule; and Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431 (1984), holding that evidence, found as a result of an interrogation that violated Miranda
("fruit of the poisoned tree"), may still be admissible if it would have inevitably been
discovered by other means. An interesting commentary on the latter doctrine may be found
in P.E. Johnson, 'The Return of the Christian Burial Speech Case" (1983) 32 Emory LJ. 349,
written in anticipation of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Nix v. Williams,
supra.
1990]
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relevance due to the very different constitutional structures of our
two nations. It is true that, in its early years, the Court flirted
briefly with United States jurisprudence in attempting to sort out the
meaning of the trade and commerce clause and then again when the
Canadian Bill of Rights was passed in 1960, but neither relationship
lasted.19  Even now that the Charter has brought Canada's
constitution much more in line with that of the United States, the
Supreme Court's attitude continues to be sensitive to the issue of
cultural sovereignty in the law. In R. v. Simmons, Chief Justice
Dickson described his own view in the following way:
While we must, of course, be wary of adopting American interpretations where they
do not accord with the interpretive framework of our Constitution, the American courts
have the benefit of two hundred years of experience in constitutional interpretation.
This wealth of experience may offer guidance to the judiciary in this country.
20
This is a sensible attitude. However, just what the "interpretive
framework of our Constitution" is, is much less clear now than seven
years ago, when it was based upon the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty. Not only did the Constitution Act, 1982 make serious
inroads on this concept, but the Supreme Court's own rather
restrictive approach to section 1 (the reasonable limits clause) and
relatively expansive interpretation of section 24(2) (the exclusionary
19 See F. Vaughan, "Precedent and Nationalism in the Supreme Court of Canada"
(address to the Annual Meeting of the Association of Canadian Studies in the United States,
April 1975. More generally, see J.G. Snell & F. Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada:
History of the Institution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985). A good early example
of a Canadian court looking south for guidance is the Supreme Court of British Columbia in
the late nineteenth century, when it had to pass on provincial anti-Chinese legislation: see,
for example, Tai Sing v. Maguire (1878), 1 B.C.L.R. 101 and R v. Wing Chong (1885), 1
B.C.L.R. 150. More recently, the late Bora Laskin, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Canada, was more inclined than most to find assistance in American law.
20 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495, 45 C.C.C. 296 at 312 [hereinafter Simmons cited to C.C.C.]. For
other references to the use of American precedent by the Supreme Court, see D.M. Paciocco,
Charter Principles and Proof in Criminal Cases (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 81-85; J. Atrens,
The Charter and Ciminal Procedure (Toronto: Butterworths, 1989) at 1-19ff; and W.H.
Charles, T.A. Cromwell & K-B. Jobson, Evidence and de Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1989) at 27ff. The last mentioned study gathers a number of
comments by Supreme Court justices on how the courts should use American law in the
Charter age.
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rule) has served to emphasize and to confirm this change 21 So has
governmental reluctance to use the section 33 override.22
In working out a new framework, the American experience is
clearly of critical importance. As Chief Justice Dickson points out,
United States courts have been at this sort of thing for some time
and certainly the Charter was forged with one eye on the American
Bill of Rights.23 Although courts would be ill-advised to ignore
American doctrine, making effective use of it is a daunting task.
One commentator contends that this "diffuse and obtuse" mass of
precedent cannot be understood out of context, concluding that the
Supreme Court "could only feel confident applying American
doctrine to the Charter after conducting a far-reaching and
time-consuming inquiry."24  We agree. However, the cases
discussed in Section III raise the question of whether the Court has
the time and the resources for engaging in such inquiry. In a
number of them, it would appear that the justices have not referred
to United States law for the guidance recommended by Chief Justice
Dickson in Simmons.
25
In assessing the extent to which the Supreme Court of Canada
has consulted United States and, primarily, Supreme Court authority
21 In R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321 [hereinafter Oakes cited to
C.C.C.], the Court set out stringent criteria for invoking section 1 to save otherwise bad
legislation. In subsequent cases, these criteria have been applied in a manner that seems
rather difficult to square with Oakes. And in such cases as Collins, supra, note 12 and R v.
Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 [hereinafter Manninen cited to C.C.C.],
the Court has, notwithstanding the inherent flexibility of section 24(2), interpreted the
exclusionary rule as virtually an automatic one in certain circumstances. As Paciocco points
out, statements obtained in violation of the section 10(b) right to counsel may even be more
readily excluded than "non-Mirandized" statements in the United States. See Paciocco, supra,
note 15 at 577.
22 Even knowledgeable commentators in Canada have referred to the Quebec
government's decision to invoke the section 33 override to preserve its commercial signs law
as a "defiance" of the Supreme Court. Yet, section 33 is as much a part of the Charter as any
of its other provisions.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. I-XV. Although it probably owes just as much to European and
international documents, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 220 (XXI) 21 U.N. GOAR, supp. (No. 16), 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
24 J. Cameron, "Liberty, Authority, and the State in American Constitutionalism" (1987)
25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 257 at 260, note 10.
25 See supra, note 20 and accompanying text at 736.
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in developing Canadian criminal law under the Charter, we had to
impose a number of limitations. In the first place, we chose a
cut-off date of February, 1989. Consequently, no rulings made by
the Court subsequent to that date are included for the purposes of
quantitative analysis. Second, we excluded specialty areas such as
immigration and extradition and, of course, all non-criminal decisions
(e.g., human rights, labour law), unless some issue in the case
justified inclusion.26 These two limitations left us with a total of 65
cases. Finally, we excluded ten more cases because they were
decided wholly by mechanically applying an earlier or companion
case or were otherwise deemed to be statistically insignificant.
These considerations reduced the total number of cases to 55, all of
which are listed in Appendix 1.27
In the end, we were able to come to only two clear
conclusions. First, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the issues
in 30 of these 55 cases (54.5%) without referring to any American
authority.28 In fact, the real number of such cases is even higher.
In at least five more cases, the reference to United States precedent
was only to the American "rule" or "experience" or was in some
26 For example, although B.C.G.E.U. v. Bitish Columbia (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, 44
C.C.C. (3d) 289 is a labour law case, it involved a citation for criminal contempt and was
therefore included. Similarly, R v. Amway Corp., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 21 [hereinafter Amway]
made the list because it involved self-incrimination and section 11(c) of the Charter,
notwithstanding that this issue arose on discovery in an action for forfeiture.
27 See infra at 784ff. Cases excluded under the latter category were Laviolette v. I?,
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 667, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 476, companion case to Vaillancourt, supra, note 11; R
v. Dairy Supplies, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 665, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 382, applying Collins, supra, note 12;
Carter v. R., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 981, 26 C.C.C. (3d) 572, companion case to Mills v. R, [1986]
1 S.C.R. 863, 26 C.C.C. (3d) 481 [hereinafter Mills cited to C.C.C.]; Trask v. R., [1985] 1
S.C.R. 655, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 514 and Rahn v. R, [1985] 1 S.C.R 659, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 516
companion cases to R v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 [hereinafter
Therens cited to C.C.C.]; Burnham v. Ackroyd, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 572, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 115,
Trumbley and Pugh v. Metropolitan Police Force, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 577, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 118 and
Trimm v. Durham Regional Police Force, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 582, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 120 companion
cases to Wigglesworth v. R, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 541, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 385; and Hamill v. R, [1987]
1 S.C.R. 301, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 110 and Sieben v. R, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 295, 32 C.C.C. (3d) 574
companion cases to Collins, supra, note 12.
28 For a discussion of some of the more important of these cases, see below, section III,
infra at 740ff.
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other way inconsequential.29 Second, in only one of the 25 cases
in which some reference to comparable United States law was made
did the Court explicitly and firmly reject it, although it was partially
rejected or, at least, modified in a few more3 ° In the remaining
cases, United States authority was cited ostensibly to support and
sometimes to shape the result reached by the Court, but in most of
these the influence can be described as marginal.31  In some,
American precedents were referred to briefly and without any real
effect;32 in others, they were considered on one issue, but ignored,
or at least not referred to, on another.33 This category is therefore
29 The quoted references are to Collins, supra, note 12 at 12 and the Motor Vehicle Act
Reference, supra, note 16 at 296, respectively. In 7herens, supra, note 27, Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) [hereinafter Miranda] was referred to, but inconsequentially: see infra,
note 82. The remaining two cases in this category are Amway, supra, note 26 and Spencer v.
R, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278, 21 C.C.C. (3d) 385. On the other hand, some cases that do not refer
to American law refer to earlier Supreme Court decisions that do so, and this phenomena can
only increase with time. The numbers, like all numbers, must therefore be treated with
caution.
30 The clear case is Hufsky v. R, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 398 [hereinafter
Hufsky cited to C.C.C.] discussed below, section III.E., infra at 776ff. In R v. Big M Drug
Mart, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 295, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 385, Chief Justice Dickson remarked that American
First Amendment cases were "not particularly helpful" to freedom of religion issues under the
Charter. In Rahey v. R, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 289 [hereinafter Rahey cited to
C.C.C.], United States precedent is adopted, but in a modified form. Note also that in Mack,
supra, note 12 the Court referred extensively to two lines of American authority on
entrapment in order to opt for a version of the minority view. This issue did not directly
involve the Charter, however. Arguably, the Supreme Court's willingness in the Motor Vehicle
Reference, supra, note 16 to plunge into what is referred to in American jurisprudence as
"substantive due process" could also be classified as a rejection of American law, but no cases
were considered.
31 Although any list will be somewhat subjective, examples of cases in which United
States authority appeared to have an important influence on the outcome include Hunter v.
Southamn Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 [hereinafter Hunter cited to C.C.C.];
Oakes, supra, note 21; Mack, supra, note 12 (an entrapment case in which the Charter was not
the primary issue); R v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 207 [hereinafter
Clarkson cited to C.C.C.] which is discussed below, sections III.A.1. and III.B., infra at 748ff.,
759ff.
32 See supra, note 29. In some cases, of course, different justices cited the authority in
different ways, or some cited it and others did not. A good example of both phenomena is
Rahey, supra, note 30, discussed in note 171, infra.
33 See, for example, R v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244 [hereinafter
Dymnent cited to C.C.C.]. See also Shmnons, supra, note 20. Both are discussed below, section
III.B., infra at 759ff.
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difficult to break down in terms of meaningful numbers or
percentages. Instead, we offer an analysis of a number of cases,
some referring to American precedent and some not, in which the
Supreme Court of Canada has attempted to work out the
constitutionalization of Canadian criminal law. In our opinion, this
analysis shows, not only that American law is not being
systematically and regularly consulted, but also that, in key areas, it
does not protect the accused as much as Canadian law now does.
III. FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHTS
The time-honoured constitutional liberties, generally regarded
as fundamental to the Anglo-American criminal process, have an
almost talismanic quality, even though in practice they may not
function quite as the textbooks might lead one to believe.34 In the
United States, notwithstanding the recent rhetoric of "bright lines,"
the working out of their implications has led to such a wilderness of
precedent that so-called basic rights threaten to become the arcane
preserve of the specialist 5  In public debate, on the other hand,
they can all too easily degenerate into a sort of legal mantra or
trump card that easily defeats arguments based upon considerations
that the dominant ideology declines to classify as rights. Professor
Nagel argues that the controversy over the right to bail, for example,
is expressed "in the form of the phrase 'presumption of innocence'
- an idea that, like the equally simplistic right to bear arms,' is
usually invoked in order to shut down normal processes of
3 here are those who contend that the elaborate American scheme of constitutional
rights has contributed to a situation in which only the few who actually go to trial receive its
protection. The rest trade these rights in a plea bargaining process that Packer, sipra, note
14, describes as more administrative than judicial. See, for example, M. Damaska,
"Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative
Study" (1973) 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506.
35 The phrase is used, for example, in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)
[hereinafter Edwards], a right to counsel case. On the "bright lines" issue in another context
see E.J. Butterfoss, "Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When Fourth
Amendment Activity Begins" (1988) 79 3. Crim. L. and Criminology 437.
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thought."36  It is, of course, the job of the courts to make sense of
such phrases, but, in an era of conflicting ideologies, this daunting
assignment is difficult in the extreme.
37
In Canada, the absence of rights review and an exclusionary
rule between 1867 and 1982 meant that, compared to the United
States, very little appeared to turn on fundamental concepts such
as the presumption of innocence. This was probably because, to
most of its managers, the system seemed to be functioning at least
as well as the American one. They believed that the presumption
of innocence and related ideas infused the process, even if they
could not be invoked to invalidate laws or to exclude evidence.
However, during this period, Canadian law departed significantly
from American and, to some degree, British law in a number of
important respects. For example, it permitted writs of assistance
and Crown appeals of jury acquittals, denied witnesses the right to
refuse to answer incriminating questions, encouraged but did not
require police to advise suspects who were about to be interrogated
that they had a right to a lawyer, and admitted all relevant and
otherwise admissible evidence, however obtained3 8 If these were
failings, and certainly many thought that they were, reform lay with
the legislators, not the courts. The Charter has, of course, provided
reformers with a new tool and legislators with a new excuse for not
acting.
39
36 R. Nagel, The No-Bail Solution" in The New Republic (24 April 1989) 13. On rights
as "trumps," see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1978).
37 See, generally, A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed. (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) and Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).
38 A quick way to assess how strikingly Canadian criminal law has changed is to compare
the pre-Charter British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in R v. Speannan (1982), 70
C.C.C. (2d) 371 with the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in Manninen, supra, note 21.
Of the listed differences between Canadian and Anglo-American law, only Crown appeals and
the rule respecting incriminating questions have, thus far, survived the Charter.
39 In Vaillancourt, supra, note 11, the Federal Government did not even show up in court
to defend the felony-murder rule, although they had neglected to move its repeal themselves.
And on the abortion issue in Morgentaler, supra, note 11, neither Parliament nor the Court
seems especially anxious to re-write the law. At time of writing, the federal government has
just introduced its long-awaited attempt at such a law.
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At bottom, the working out of the meaning of constitutional
liberties (or "legal rights," as most of them are called in the
Canadian Charter) involves analysis of the idea of fairness, especially
procedural fairness, as applied to the criminal law.40 In the United
States, the drafters of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments called
this legal concept of fairness "due process." Their counterparts in
Canada, attempting unsuccessfully to avoid some of the pitfalls of
the American jurisprudence, chose to call it "fundamental justice."41
The Americans defined it in terms of life, liberty, and property. The
Canadians, nervous about provincial jurisdiction and especially the
power to regulate and nationalize natural resources companies, left
out property and substituted "security of the person." But whatever
the terminology, in both countries fairness in the criminal context
has at least two components. One is the idea of privacy and
individual autonomy, which, although mentioned in neither the
American Bill nor the Canadian Charter, has been read into both
(the Fourth Amendment and section 8, respectively). 42 The other
is the presumption of innocence, set out in section 11(d) of the
Canadian Charter, but which, again, had to be read into the
American Bill of Rights, this time into the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
43
40 See, for example, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) at 170 [hereinafter Rochln]
where the "vague contours" of the due process clause (the Fourteenth Amendment) were
invoked to attack a search by means of a stomach pump. Convictions, wrote Justice
Frankfurter for the Court, "cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of
justice'." Ibid. at 173.
41 The Fourteenth Amendment (1868) applies due process to the individual states by
providing that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." Section 7 of the Charter states that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice." Section 15, subject to an affirmative action exception,
guarantees that "[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination."
42 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) [hereinafter Katz] commended and adopted
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter, supra, note 31. It should also be noted that in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court based the right of privacy
on the combined influence of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, the latter of which formed the basis of the right of privacy asserted in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43 See Oakes, supra, note 21 and the United States cases cited therein.
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These two, in turn, give rise to at least three overlapping ideas
that are also fundamental to both the rhetoric and the reality of
American and Canadian criminal justice. The first is the privilege
against self-incrimination, which, once again, is not specifically
mentioned in either constitutional document, but which is clearly the
idea behind the Fifth Amendment and sections 11(c) and 13 of the
Charter.44 The second is the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures, contained in the Fourth Amendment and
section 8 of the Charter. The third, the right to counsel, is really
a facilitative right, which both the Sixth Amendment and section
10(b) of the Charter specifically guarantee and which the United
States Supreme Court has read into the Fifth Amendment as well.45
Both the Bill and the Charter of Rights enumerate many other
guarantees, but it is submitted that these are even more derivative.46
Whether these ideas are called rights, presumptions, protections,
or privileges, it is interesting to note that the more fundamental the
concept, the less likely it is to have been expressed or, at least,
expressed with precision.47  Perhaps that is proof positive of our
common, and common law, heritage. A second point worth noting
is that the different ways in which key ideas have been arranged in
The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that "[n]o person shall ... be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." Sections 11(c) and 13 state, again in part, that a person charged
with an offence "has the right ... not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against
that person in respect of the offence," and that a witness "has the right not to have any
incriminating evidence ... given [by him or her] used to incriminate that witness in any other
proceedings." Because Justice Lamer in the Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 16 was of
the opinion that the legal rights set out in sections 8 to 14 of the Charter are merely examples
of the principles of fundamental justice, it has been argued that an even wider privilege against
self-incrimination than that referred to in sections 11(c) and 13 is protected by section 7. So
far, the courts have reacted warily to this notion, and it has yet to come squarely before the
Supreme Court. [Since this was written, it has. See the split and rather inconclusive decision
of the Court in Thompson Newspapers Ltd v. Director of Investigation & Research, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 425, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417 [hereinafter Thompson cited to C.C.C.]].
45 See Miranda, supra, note 29, and see also section III.A., inf-a at 744ff.
46 Thus, the right to reasonable bail and not to be arbitrarily detained can be derived
from the presumption of innocence. The right not to be subjected to cruel or unusual
punishment can be derived from the right to privacy and personal autonomy, etc.
47 Note also that this characterization is based, not upon history, but upon the courts'
approach. Historically, the notion of a witness' privilege against self-incrimination would
appear to be older than the presumption of innocence.
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the two constitutions may well have had important consequences for
how they have been interpreted.48 To explore this further, we now
turn to a comparison of some of the cases. We do so with a view
to isolating the ways in which three of these ideas, the right to
counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the protection
against unreasonable search and seizure, combine in each jurisdiction
to produce particular results.
A. The Right to Counsel and Self-Incimination
There are three distinct questions involving the right to counsel:
(1) whether there is such a right at all; (2) at what point, if any,
police are obliged to inform persons with whom they deal that they
have this right; and (3) whether the right includes a right to
court-appointed counsel. It is primarily the second of these that
will concern us here.
49
In both jurisdictions, it was resolved long ago that persons
accused of criminal offences have the right to retain counsel of their
choice to represent them.50 In the United States, this is guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment, which provides that in "all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the
assistance of counsel for his defence." As its wording suggests, the
Sixth Amendment does not apply until after the initiation of criminal
proceedings. It is only at that point that "the government has
committed itself to prosecute, and ... the adverse positions of
government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a
defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and
48 See Appendix II, infra at 786ff.
49 Many of the cases decided by the United States Supreme Court have focussed upon
the issue of court-appointed counsel. Perhaps, the most famous is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), extending the right, via the Fourteenth Amendment, to the states. The
Supreme Court of Canada has yet to address the issue of whether detained persons are
entitled to such counsel. However, R v. Rowbotham (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.)
is a recent, important provincial appellate court ruling.
50 The relevant date in England and Canada is 1836, at which time the right to have
counsel address the jury on the accused's behalf, previously confined to misdemeanors and
treasons, was extended to felonies.
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procedural criminal law."51  Therefore, the right enshrined in the
Sixth Amendment attaches, not only at trial, but whenever persons
subject to criminal charges find themselves "immersed in the
intricacies" of the law: for example, at post-indictment line-ups,
preliminary hearings, and arraignments.52 It must be emphasized,
however, that, unlike Canada, it is not a right that arises simply
because the police arrest or detain an individual.53
The Canadian right to counsel is contained in section 10(b) of
the Chatter, which recites the pre-existing right to seek the advice
of counsel and adds a new one:5 4 "Everyone has the right on arrest
or detention, [not only] to retain and instruct counsel without delay,
[but also] to be informed of that right." This wording, which clearly
goes beyond the Sixth Amendment, reflects developments in the
United States during the 1960s, when the Supreme Court held that
there is also a limited Fifth Amendment right to counsel that arises
earlier in the process. The policy behind this right, which was set
out in the famous case of Miranda v. Arizona, is quite different from
that contained in the Sixth Amendment. 
5 5
51 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) at 170, quoting from Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682 (1972) at 689 [hereinafter Kirby]. This may be an appropriate place to note that
Canadian indictments are preferred much later in the process than in the United States by
agents of the Attorney-General instead of grand juries. In Canada, prosecutions are
commenced by laying an information (which may be sworn by anyone), but in serious cases
the information is replaced by an indictment prior to trial.
52 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) [hereinafter Wade]; Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1 (1970); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977), where arraignment on an arrest warrant was viewed as the equivalent of an
indictment. Brewer invoked the earlier case of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964),
where federal agents, using a "wired" informant, elicited an incriminating statement from the
defendant after he had been indicted and had retained counsel. The Court held that this
deprived him of the assistance of counsel and violated the Sixth Amendment.
53 In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court broke new ground and held
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the investigatory stage. Escobedo,
however, was eroded by Miranda, supra, note 29 and implicitly overruled in Kirby, supra, note
51.
54 The pre-Ldsting right referred only to retaining and instructing counsel, not to being
advised of the right. It was contained in what is now section 650 of the Criminal Code and,
after 1960, in section 2(c)(ii) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, which was only a federal statute.
The guarantee therefore did not apply to provincial prosecutions, and even federally it could
be repealed in the ordinary way.
5 5 Miranda, supra, note 29.
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In Miranda, it was held that the right to have counsel present
at a "custodial interrogation"5 6 was "necessary to make the process
of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege
[against self-incrimination. The] presence [of counsel] would insure
that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are
not the product of compulsion."57  This right is not concerned with
helping suspects to cope with legal technicalities. Rather, it is
designed to protect them in the exercise of their privilege against
self-incrimination during custodial interrogation, that is, from being
compelled to speak.58 To accomplish this, the Court in Miranda
set out a four-part warning that is triggered when a suspect is in
police custody and the police wish to question him or to engage in
behaviour which is the functional equivalent of questioning.5 9 These
are: (1) that he has the right to remain silent; (2) that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law; (3) that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney; and (4) that, if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning, if he so desires. 60 Because Miranda requires that even
a confession that is otherwise voluntary be excluded if the warnings
5 6 Ibid. at 444.
57 Ibid. at 466.
58 In both Canada and the United States, if a suspect asserts his right to counsel, all
questioning must cease. See Manninen, supra, note 21 and Edwards, supra, note 35.
Manninen makes no reference to Edwards, which held that the initial assertion of the right to
counsel is waived only if the defendant personally initiates a subsequent conversation with the
police. Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not depend upon the defendant
requesting a lawyer, the United States Supreme Court held in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S.
625 (1986) [hereinafter Jackson] that the Edwards rule also applies to Sixth Amendment
situations, for example, at an arraignment. The shelter afforded by the right to counsel at this
stage, said the Court, has two aspects: protecting defendants from compelled
self-incrimination (the Fifth Amendment), and providing them with legal advice because an
adversary proceeding has been initiated (the Sixth Amendment). These issues are discussed
more fully below. See section III.A.1., infra at 748ff.
59 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) [hereinafter Innis].
60 On Miranda, supra, note 29 and the Charter, see Paciocco, supra, note 15 and his
earlier essay 'The Development of Miranda-like Doctrines under the Charter" (1987) 19
Ottawa L. Rev. 49. Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings
need not be given in the exact form described in that decision. 'The inquiry," wrote Chief
Justice Rehnquist, "is simply whether the warnings reasonably conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights
as required by Miranda." See Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989) at 2880.
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are not given, it may in effect go beyond the strict requirements of
the Fifth Amendment.61
Only a version of the third warning is set out in section 10(b)
and, thus far, none of the other warnings have been read into the
section. However, the drafters of the Canadian Charter probably
had Miranda in mind when describing the warning as being
applicable at the detention stage and requiring that, at that stage,
suspects be advised of it.62 Yet, the Miranda principle is narrower
than may first appear. As the actual wording of the Fifth
Amendment indicates, it is based upon the non-compellability of the
accused at trial. Although this was extended in Miranda to pre-trial
custodial interrogation, the Fifth Amendment, like the common law
privilege against self-incrimination, does not extend to physical
evidence.63 Nor are the Miranda warnings legally triggered by
detention or even arrest. As a consequence, police are not required
to warn suspects before they are placed in pre-indictment line-ups,
before hand-writing samples are obtained, or before blood-samples
are taken.64 The warnings are mandated only if an individual "is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
61 Indeed, the Miranda warnings have been described as mere procedural guarantees
which are distinct from hallowed constitutional protections. The failure to read Miranda gives
rise only to a presumption of compulsion, not the actual compulsion prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) [hereinafter Elstad] and see also
infra, note 126. In Elstad, the majority wrote that the Miranda exclusionaty rule "sweeps more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself." 1bid at 306. The Court held that using a voluntary
confession made subsequent to an earlier, unwarned, but uncoerced statement does not violate
the Fifth Amendment.
62 As a matter of practice, Canadian police regularly advise suspects of their right to
silence when they read them their section 10(b) rights. [Since this was written, the Supreme
Court has held that detainees should be routinely informed of the availability of duty and legal
aid counsel: R v. Brydges, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 330. The Court has also ruled
that, although there is no mention of the right to silence in the Charter, it is a principle of
fundamental justice protected by section 7: Hebert v. R (21 June 1990).]
63 It protects the accused only from compelled testimonial evidence, which is generally
defined as written or oral statements, made in or out of court, which incriminates the maker.
64 See Kirby, supra, note 51, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) [hereinafter
Gilbert]; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) [hereinafter Schmerber]. Each is
discussed below. See sections III.A.3. and III.B.1., infta at 755ff. and 760ff respectively. The
statement in the text does not mean, however, that in these situations police will not facilitate
access to counsel upon request.
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authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning."
65
Section 10(b) of the Charter, on the other hand, requires police to
advise persons of their right to counsel upon arrest or detention.
The Supreme Court of Canada appears to have interpreted this as
applying whether the police intend to ask questions or not.
1. Waiving the Right to Counsel
Before looking at how the Canadian Court has tended not to
apply the more limited American view of what triggers the right to
counsel, it would be helpful to consider briefly a case on waiver that
illustrates some of the difficulties facing Canadian judges forced to
navigate through American criminal jurisprudence.
R. v. Clarkson concerned the admissibility of a confession to
the police and the validity of an intoxicated and emotionally
overwrought accused's waiver of her right to counsel.66 Mrs.
Clarkson was arrested soon after the shooting death of her husband
and was told, on at least two occasions, of her section 10(b) rights.
Nonetheless, she steadfastly and drunkenly maintained, against the
advice of a relative who was present at her interrogation, that she
did not need a lawyer. The police, as might be expected, took her
at her word.
In deciding that Mrs. Clarkson's waiver was invalid, the Court,
in effect, ruled that a waiver will not be upheld simply because there
was an absence of coercion by police.67  The majority reasons cite
65 Miranda, supra, note 29 at 478. Thus, although American police routinely Mirandize
suspects to avoid legal quibbles later on, many such warnings are not, strictly speaking,
necessary. Justice L'Heureux-Dubd, dissenting on this point in Simmons, supra, note 20 at
332, recognized this difference when she urged that, as in the United States, self-incrimination
should be a concern "chiefly' during custodial interrogation and not during a detention and
search. See below, section III.B.2., infra at 764ff.
66 Supra, note 31.
67 See Paciocco, supra, note 15 at 575, note 12. In the United States, the Supreme Court
held in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) that where police did not coerce the waiver,
there was no constitutional requirement that the effect of the defendant's mental illness on
its voluntariness be examined. In Connelly, however, the police were unaware of the mental
state of the suspect. The Supreme Court of Canada, in R v. Baig, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 537, 37
C.C.C. (3d) 181, declined an opportunity to say more about when police should inquire
further about a failure to invoke the right to counsel.
[VOL. 28. No. 4
1990] Ties That Bind? 749
and quote passages from three United States cases, two of which,
Von Moltke v. Gillies68 and Adams v. United States,69 are decisions
of the Supreme Court. The excerpt from the former reads as
follows:
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the
charges, the statutory offences included within them, the range of allowable
punishments thereunder, possible defences to the charges and circumstances in
mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole
matter.
70
Wilson, J. relied upon what she called this "wealth" of American
case law to support an "awareness of consequences" test in Canada
and ruled against the waiver. But she questioned whether one had
to go as far as Von Moltke did in "requiring an accused to be tuned
in to the legal intricacies of the case."
71
The answer is that the United States Supreme Court does not
go this far. Clarkson was a case that in the United States would
give rise only to the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, that is, to
Miranda and to the jurisprudence respecting the waiver of Miranda
rights. The Fifth Amendment most certainly does not require that
the defendant understand all the legal consequences of speaking
before a waiver will be upheld.72 Adams and Von Moltke, on the
other hand, were cases involving defendants who had purported to
waive their Sixth Amendment right to counsel, one at trial, the other
68332 U.S. 708 (1948) [hereinafter Von Moltke].
69 317 U.S. 269 (1942) [hereinafter Adams].
70 Von Molike, supra, note 68 at 724. Quoted in Clarkson, supra, note 31 at 218.
71 Clarkson, supra, note 31 at 218-19.
72 As Justice O'Connor put it in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 at 422 (1986)
[hereinafter Burbine], the defendant need only know that he "could stand mute and request
a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State's intention to use his statements to secure a
conviction." The Court, therefore, upheld a Fifth Amendment Miranda waiver where the
police had told Burbine's lawyer that they would not question him or place him in a line-up,
but had not told Burbine that the lawyer was trying to reach him. (Note that the passage in
the text accompanying this footnote was written prior to our discovering that Professor M.T.
MacCrimmon makes a similar point in "Developments in the Law of Evidence: The 1985-86
Term" (1987) 9 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 363 at 380ff.)
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on a guilty plea.73  The majority reasons in Clarkson, therefore,
apply United States Supreme Court precedent for a Sixth
Amendment waiver to a Fifth Amendment situation.74 How much
turned on this misunderstanding, assuming that is what it was, is
debatable. But the case is a good indication of how easily United
States precedent, which is a maze that ought to daunt the hardiest
of foreign travellers, can be misapplied. In Clarkson, this blending
of American law may have contributed to a premature narrowing of
the options available to judges attempting to fashion a sensible
waiver doctrine. There is, in fact, a good chance that the waiver
would have been ruled voluntary in the United States. As that
country's Supreme Court said in a 1980 decision, the definitions of
"interrogation" in Fifth and Sixth Amendment cases are "not
necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two
constitutional protections are quite distinct.
"7s
73While both Fifth and Sixth Amendment waivers must be "knowingly and intelligently"
made, the trial judge's duty under the Sixth is to ensure that the defendant is "aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open'." See Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975) at 835 [hereinafter Faretta]. Thus, if Burbine, supra, note 72 had been
a Sixth Amendment case, the waiver there would not have been upheld. Once formal
proceedings have been instituted, the lawyer becomes a medium between the defendant and
the state. Unless the defendant initiates a conversation with the police, they cannot question
him without contacting his lawyer first. See Jackson, supra, note 58.
74 This is being done at a time when, absent the complicating factor of alcohol, the
United States Supreme Court is resisting arguments similar to those accepted by Wilson, J.
in Clarkson, supra, note 31. See, for example, Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988)
[hereinafter Patterson], where the police questioned the defendant after an indictment had
been returned, but before a lawyer had been appointed. Patterson had been read his
Miranda rights, which he waived, and he conceded that the Miranda warning may have been
sufficient for the purpose of protecting his Fifth Amendment rights. His argument was that
the indictment entitled him to Sixth Amendment protection and that, in the absence of a
specific warning about the dangers of talking to police, his waiver was neither knowing nor
intelligent. See Farretta, supra, note 73. The Court disagreed. Noting that Patterson had
never asserted his right to counsel, the majority ruled that, "[a]s a general matter ... an
accused who is admonished with the warnings ... in Miranda ... has been sufficiently apprised
of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights [as well]." Ibid. at 2396-97. Burbine was
explained in the manner set out supra, note 73.
75 Innis, supra, note 59 at 300, note 4. For a statement of what these distinct policies
are, see text accompanying notes 51-57, supra at 745ff. The fact that Clarkson had a relative
present throughout the interrogation, who repeatedly urged her to consult a lawyer before
answering any questions, underlines this. Of course, all cases ultimately turn on their facts.




The detention of motorists is perhaps the best example of a
situation in which the two Supreme Courts have differed on the
question of limits on the right to be informed of the right to
counsel. The leading Canadian case is Therens.76 It is a case which
began on the evening of 24 April 1982, just a week after the
Charter of Rights came into force, including the new section 10(b)
obligation to inform detainees of their right to counsel. Therens
lost control of his automobile and collided with a tree in Moose
Jaw, Saskatchewan. The investigating officer, pursuant to what was
then section 235(1) of the Criminal Code, demanded that Therens
accompany him to the police station to provide breath samples for
blood-alcohol analysis. (Refusal to do so was - and is - a criminal
offence, whereas in the United States it tends to be penalized by
licence suspension.) Therens co-operated and was convicted on the
basis of the breathalyzer readings obtained. He was not advised that
he had a right to counsel.
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the view that the term
"detained" should retain the meaning it had in earlier cases. Citing
the Chat-ter as a "new affirmation of rights and freedoms and of
judicial power and responsibility in relation to their protection,"
77
the Court shed its earlier Canadian Bill of Rights jurisprudence,
including its own 1979 ruling that someone in Therens' situation was
not detained.78  It now held that a detention occurs whenever "a
police officer or other agent of the state assumes control over the
movement of a person by a demand or a direction which may have
intoxicated state of the accused, see D.M. Nissman, E. Hagen & P.R. Brooks eds, Law of
Confessions (Rochester, New York: Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing, 1985). In any event, the
case underscores Chief Justice Dickson's warning in Hunter, supra, note 31 at 109 that
"American decisions can be transplanted to the Canadian context only with the greatest
caution." He did not take part in Clarkson, supra, note 31.
76 Supra, note 27.
77 Ibid. at 501.
78 See Chromniak v. R. (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471, 49 C.C.C. (2d) 257.
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significant legal consequences and which prevents or impedes access
to counsel."79
A majority of the Court (6:2) then excluded the blood-alcohol
certificate. It called the failure to read Therens his right to counsel
a "flagrant" violation of the Charter, holding that to countenance
admitting such evidence would, in the words of section 24(2), "bring
the administration of justice into disrepute."80  Justice Lamer, in
particular, stressed the fact that this was a situation where detainees
were required by law to provide evidence which might be - and in
this case was - incriminating.81 The only reference to American
authority was a somewhat cryptic statement by Justice Lamer to the
effect that there was no need to decide the extent to which section
10(b) might encompass the Miranda "principle."8 2  Subsequently, a
unanimous Court applied the same analysis to roadside screening
devices, but read a limitation on the right to counsel into the
relevant legislation and upheld this limit as reasonable under section
1 of the Charter
8 3
In marked contrast, the United States Supreme Court has
refused to extend the Fifth Amendment right to counsel to
situations where suspects are merely detained. In Berkemer v.
McCarty, which is not mentioned in Therens, an Ohio Highway
79 Therens, supra, note 27 at 504.
80 Ibid. at 489.
81 Ibid. at 490. Although legal advice may be of little use in such situations, in a recent
case the Court decisively rejected the argument that this has any relevance to the right to
counsel. As Justice Wilson put it in R. v. Black (1989), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at 12: "If the
Crown's argument on this point were sound, each time an accused was asked to blow into a
breathalyzer there would be no need to advise [him] of his s.10(b) rights since ... counsel
would advise ... that he should submit ... on the basis that failure to do so constitutes a
criminal offence. Such reasoning runs directly afoul of ... Therens." Compare Dickson C.J.
in Simmons, supra, note 20 at 315-16.
82 "Whether s.10(b) extends any further, so as to encompass, for example, the principle
of Miranda v. Arizona ... and apply to matters such as interrogation and police line-ups, need
not be decided in this case and I shall refrain from so doing." Ibid. at 491. For line-ups, see
section III.A.3., ihfra at 755ff.
83 R. v. Thomsen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 411 [hereinafter Thonsen cited
to C.C.C.]. The Court cited at length the studies submitted by the Crown as proof of the
hazards created by drunk drivers and concluded that roadside testing is an important
mechanism for increasing the likelihood of detecting them. A limitation on the right to
counsel was, therefore, in the words of section 1, "demonstrably justified."
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Patrol officer observed the defendant weaving in and out of traffic,
stopped him, and decided then and there to make an arrest.84 The
officer asked Berkemer to perform a field sobriety test (which he
could not do without falling) and then inquired whether he had used
intoxicants. Berkemer replied that he had drunk two beers and
smoked some marijuana a short time before. After successfully
eliciting this statement, the officer then formally arrested Berkemer
and transported him to the county jail, where a blood test failed to
detect the presence of alcohol. However, at this point questioning
resumed, and Berkemer admitted once again that he had consumed
alcohol. At no time was he warned that he had a right to remain
silent or that he had a right to consult an attorney.
The United States Supreme Court was faced in Berkemer with
two issues. The first was whether the Miranda warnings applied to
misdemeanors as well as to felonies. The second was, if they did,
whether roadside questioning by police officers in these
circumstances amounted to custodial interrogation. The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was irrelevant because it does not
apply to arrests or detentions. In a unanimous opinion, the Court
held that Miranda did apply to misdemeanors, but it is their ruling
on the second issue that reveals the difference between the two
jurisdictions.
Defence counsel in Berkemer invited the Court to endorse a
rule that motorists detained and questioned pursuant to a routine
traffic stop were subject to custodial interrogation. The Court
declined, holding that to extend Miranda in this way would be
unwarranted. Justice Marshall said that the issue was "whether a
traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently
impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to
require that he be warned of his constitutional rights."85 He stated
that a traffic stop is brief, executed in public view, and, at most,
involves only one or two police officers. It is not, he concluded, the
kind of police-dominated environment which the Miranda warning
84 468 U.S. 420 (1984) [hereinafter Berkemer].
85 Ibid. at 437. Although Justice Lamer in Therens stated that there was no need to
decide whether section 10(b) represented a version of the Miranda principle, it is precisely the
issue isolated here by Justice Marshall that Therens decides in the accused's favour. See
supra, note 82 and accompanying text at 24.
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was meant to alleviate, nor did the record indicate that anything had
occurred to bring Mr. Berkemer within Miranda.
This difference in approach is highlighted by the Court's ruling
on the statements made by Berkemer in the county jail after he was
formally arrested. Because this was the sort of police-dominated
environment that the Court deciding Miranda had in mind when it
required the reading of rights in the first place, these statements
were excluded. What triggered the need for the warnings was the
fact that Berkemer was in custody and was being interrogated about
the crime by the police. In a nutshell, the Court - speaking
unanimously through Justice Marshall, hardly a representative of the
conservative wing - held that the initial stopping of a motorist does
not by itself render the motorist in custody and therefore does not
require a warning.86
Therens and Berkemner are, of course, not perfectly comparable.
In Therens, the exclusion of physical evidence, a breathalyzer
certificate, was at issue. In Berkemer, the issue was not the blood
sample, but the statement made at the scene. However, this only
makes the contrast all the more remarkable. The Supreme Court of
Canada would have excluded, while the Supreme Court of the
United States would have admitted, both the statement and the
physical evidence. Not only does the Miranda decision not apply to
routine traffic stops, its recited rights are not necessary if the police
86 The Court in Berkeiner, supra, note 84 at 440 supported its reasoning by noting that
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) [hereinafter Teny], in which a "stop-and-frisk" search
without probable cause was held not to be unreasonable, there was no suggestion "that Teny
stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda)" Nor did it matter that the officer decided to
arrest Berkemer as soon as he stopped him: "A policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing
on the question whether a suspect [is] 'in custody' at a particular time." Ibid. at 442. See also
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) [hereinafter Orozco] and Beckwith v. United States, 425
U.S. 341 (1976) [hereinafter Beckwith] concerning questioning at the home of someone who
had become the focus of an investigation, and Oregon v. Matiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)
[hereinafter Madiason] concerning suspects who voluntarily attend at a police station for
questioning. It appears that such questioning is deemed custodial and subject to Miranda only
if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have regarded himself as in custody.
[Since this was written, the Supreme Court has addressed this issue in R v. Hicks, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 120, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 575 by adopting the reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal
reported at (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 394.]
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intend only to obtain a breath sample. There is, therefore, a
considerable gap between the two courts on this issue.
87
3. Line-ups
The distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial
evidence, which grounds both the common law privilege against
self-incrimination and the United States Fifth Amendment, can be
seen in how the American Supreme Court views the right to counsel
at pre-indictment line-ups. In Wade, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment confers an absolute right to have counsel present at
pre-trial confrontations such as line-ups 88 Although the Fifth
Amendment did not apply because the privilege against
self-incrimination covers testimonial evidence only, the Court
reasoned that line-ups, like trials, had to be properly conducted and,
therefore, fell within the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.8 9
Wade had been indicted when the line-up was held.
The force of the Court's reasoning would seem to apply to
line-ups generally, whether or not the suspect has been indicted.
However, somewhat surprisingly, that is not what was decided in
Kirby five years later.90 There, the Court confirmed its earlier view
that the Fifth Amendment did not apply because no question of
8 7 The holding in Berkemer, supra, note 84 (that Miranda does not apply to routine traffic
stops) was recently reaffirmed in Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 102 L. Ed. (2d) 172 (1988).
88 Supra, note 52.
89 The same day that Wade, supra, was decided, the Court held in Gilbert, supra, note
64 that requiring a suspect to give a handwriting exemplar in the absence of counsel did not
violate either Amendment. A distinction was therefore made between eyewitness identification
and scientific methods, such as fingerprints, blood samples, clothing, hair, etc., to which the
right to counsel did not apply. Gilbert also held that even if a post-indictment line-up is
tainted by a lack of counsel, the identification of a suspect may be made so long as it can be
demonstrated that the identification was made independently of the tainted pre-trial procedure.
This became known as the Wade-Gilbert rule. On the issue of the effect of line-up
improprieties on subsequent identification in Canada, see the reasons of Wilson, J. in R. v.
Mezzo, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802, 27 C.C.C. (3d) 97 expressly reserving the question of
constitutional fairness for another day.
90 Supra, note 51.
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testimonial self-incrimination was involved, but went on to hold that
the Sixth was also inapplicable because Kirby, unlike Wade, had not
been indicted. Thus, the decision forecloses the argument that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be relied upon at the
pre-indictment stage. Not only is there no need to Mirandize
suspects at such a line-up, there is no constitutional right to have
counsel present.
91
These cases reveal the American Supreme Court's restrictive
approach to an accused person's right to counsel at pre-indictment
line-ups. The Canadian Supreme Court, on the other hand, is
clearly of a rather different view. In R. v. Ross, three teen-aged
accuseds were arrested in the early morning hours as break and
enter suspects.92 They were advised of their right to retain and
instruct counsel, but, given that it was between 2 and 3 a.m., they
were unable to reach their lawyers by telephone. The police then
told them to participate in a line-up, and they did. The Supreme
Court of Canada ruled unanimously that the accused were denied a
reasonable opportunity to consult counsel, and the majority (4:2)
excluded the line-up evidence. No United States authority was
cited, nor was the American position referred to in any way.
93
Like Therens, the decision in Ross is remarkable, not only as
a contrast to the unacknowledged American position, but also for
the way in which it departed from previous Canadian doctrine.
Prior to Ross, the leading authority, although it was not a right to
counsel case, was R. v. Marcoux and Solomon.94 In Marcoux, Justice
91 In United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), the majority of the Court held that
showing a photographic display to a witness, after an indictment had been handed down, was
analogous to pre-trial preparation and refused to extend the Sixth Amendment to it. In Neil
v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) at 199, the Court ruled that the relevant test for a due process
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment was whether the line-up identification was reliable,
"even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive."
92 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3, 46 C.C.C. (3d) 129 [hereinafter Ross cited to C.C.C.].
93 This omission seems especially odd, when one considers Justice lamer's remarks in
Therens, supra, note 27 about deferring the issue of line-ups and the right to counsel,
presumably to an appropriate case: see supra, note 82.
94 (1975), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 763, 24 C.C.C. (2d) 1 [hereinafter Marcoux cited to C.C.C.].
Prior to the Charter, relatively few cases were right to counsel cases in this sense. Notable
exceptions include R. v. Ballegcer (1968), [1969] 3 C.C.C. 353 (Man. C.A.), and R. v. Hogan
(1974), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574, 18 C.C.C. (2d) 65 in which the Supreme Court of Canada held
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Dickson (as he then was) ruled for a unanimous Court that evidence
of bodily condition or conduct, such as line-up evidence, is not
covered by the privilege against self-incrimination. Somewhat less
convincingly, he concluded that, so long as the police behave
reasonably, compelling a suspect to take part in a line-up is "an
incident to the police power to arrest and investigate, and no more
subject to objection than compelling the accused to exhibit his
person for observation by a prosecution witness during a trial."95
Although Marcoux was referred to in Ross, it was not regarded as
precluding the Court from holding that a suspect has no obligation
to appear in a line-up. Instead, Justice Lamer noted that there was
no statutory obligation to do so and stressed that Canadian courts
had never gone beyond the actual holding in Marcoux, that evidence
of a refusal to participate was admissible in the circumstances of that
case.9
6
More significantly, however, Ross parts company with the
common law position enunciated in Marcoux (and in the American
cases) that confines the privilege against self-incrimination to
testimonial evidence.97  This departure had been already hinted at
in Collins, when Justice Lamer spoke of excluding evidence where,
as a result of a Charter violation, "the accused is conscripted against
himself through a confession or other evidence emanating from
him."98  Then, two months later, the Court prohibited police
questioning of detainees who stand on their section 10(b) rights,
until a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel has been
that breathalyzer evidence obtained in violation of the right to counsel was nonetheless
admissible.
95 Ibid. at 7.
96 Ross, supra, note 92 at 137. In Marcoux, supra, note 94 the accused had refused to
take part in the line-up. He then attacked the Crown's identification evidence on the ground
that no line-up had been held. In these circumstances, the Court held that evidence of his
refusal was admissible.
97 The leading Canadian case is Quebec (A.G.) v. Begin, [1955] S.C.R. 593.
98 Collins, supra, note 12 at 19.
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afforded.9 9 In Ross, Justice Lamer combined these rulings and
extended them to line-ups, concluding that the police were not only
under a duty to cease questioning, but also to refrain from
"otherwise attempting to elicit evidence from the detainee until he
has had a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel."100
There was, he said, no legal obligation to appear in a line-up and
counsel could have played an important role in advising a client
about participating. Because the police had not allowed the
appellants an adequate opportunity to exercise their right to counsel,
holding the line-up was a serious Charter violation. So serious, in
fact, that to admit the identification evidence it yielded would bring
the administration of justice into disrepute. To repeat: in the
United States, not only does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
not operate at this stage, but because line-up evidence is
non-testimonial, the Fifth Amendment right, based as it is upon the
privilege against self-incrimination, is of no help either. The
American Supreme Court would have approved the line-up
identification in Ross and admitted the evidence.
B. Search and Seizure
While this contrast between the two Courts is readily
discernable in search and seizure cases as well, in its first criminal
Charter case, the Supreme Court of Canada sent a rather different
99 Manninen, supra, note 21. Collins, supra, note 12, however, involved the fruits of an
illegal search which, in the United States, would have been decided under the Fourth
Amendment. R. v. Genest (1989), 45 C.C.C. (3d) 385 at 403, in which Chief Justice Dickson
suggested that evidence obtained by requiring an accused to identify objects seized in an illegal
search should be excluded. This is similar, although any statements made would also entail
Fifth Amendment considerations in the United States. The Canadian Supreme Court goes
its own way, however, when the notion of an accused being "conscripted against himself" is
applied to non-testimonial evidence in situations such as pre-indictment line-ups, in which
American courts decline to extend Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment protections. This
notion was first expressed by Justice Lamer in R. v. Dubois, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350, 22 C.C.C.
(3d) 513 [hereinafter Dubois cited to C.C.C.].
100 Ross, supra, note 92 at 136, using the same phraseology used in Manninen, supra,
note 21. Justices L'Heureux-Dube and McIntyre dissented, but cited no United States
authority. The dissent was to the effect that line-up evidence does not "emanate" from an
accused in the way a confession does, and that to admit the evidence would not bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.
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signal. Asked in Hunter to assess the search provisions of the
Combines Investigation Act10 1 against section 8 of the Charter, Chief
Justice Dickson wasted no time in embracing United States Supreme
Court authority in order to find them inadequate and strike them
down.102 Relying upon Katz, he reasoned that section 8, like the
Fourth Amendment, protects people, not places.103 Warrantless
searches, he said, are 'prima facie unreasonable" and prior
authorization for a search is necessary whenever possible.10 4  In
language that very much reflects the American approach, he
concluded that
[t]he guarantee of security from unreasonable search and seizure only protects a
reasonable expectation. This limitation on the right guaranteed by s. 8, whether it is
expressed negatively as freedom from "unreasonable" search and seizure, or positively
as an entitlement to a "reasonable" expectation of privacy, indicates that an assessment
must be made as to whether in a particular situation the public's interest in being left
alone by government must give way to the government's interest in intruding on the
individual's privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement.
1 0 5
In Simmons, the Supreme Court referred to and relied upon United
States case law once again, this time to rule that border searches
101 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
102 Supra, note 31. Section 8 provides that "Everyone has the right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure." The Fourth Amendment is more detailed: 'The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
103 Supra, note 42.
104 Hunter, supra, note 31 at 108-10. Katz, supra, note 42 required a two-part inquiry
to determine whether there was a reasonable, that is, constitutionally protected, expectation
of privacy. First, did the individual have a subjective expectation of privacy? Second, is
society willing to recognize this expectation as reasonable? Cases that have been viewed as
narrowing the Katz approach include: United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) and California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). See
also A.- Loewy, 'The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent" (1983) 81
Mich. L Rev. 1229.
105Ibid. at 108.
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are one of those "particular situations" where the privacy interest
must yield.106
1. Blood Samples
In two section 8 cases involving blood samples, however, the
Court went well beyond its United States counterpart in the
protection it was prepared to extend to the accused. References
to American case law in R. v. Pohoretsky'07  and Dyment'08 are
conspicuously absent. In Pohoretsky, the accused had been injured
in a single-vehicle accident and was incoherent and delirious. At the
direction of the police and without the consent of the accused, the
attending physician took a blood sample that was not required for
medical purposes. But Pohoretsky is the less significant of the two
cases because the Crown conceded that the taking of the blood
sample was an unreasonable search. It did so on two grounds.
First, the summary conviction appeal court had found that the police
had not established the necessary grounds, pursuant to the province
of Manitoba's Blood Test Act, for taking the sample.109 Second, the
Act was probably irrelevant in a criminal prosecution anyway. What
was then section 237(2) of the Criminal Code provided that no one
was required to give a blood sample.110 The only real issue in the
106 Supra, note 20. The American law relied upon was United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606 (1977) and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) [hereinafter Montoya de Hernandez] which was
not referred to in Sinnons.
107 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 398 [hereinafter Pohoretsky cited to C.C.C.].
108 Supra, note 33. For the quantitative part of this study, we classified Dynent as a case
which referred to United States law because, although there is no mention of the leading
American precedent on blood samples, there is a reference to the Court having adopted Katz,
supra, note 42 in Hunter, supra, note 31 and an even more peripheral quotation from Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Ohnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). This sort of thing
illustrates the classification difficulties already noted. See supra, text following note 32 at 739.
109 Blood Test Act, 1980 (Man.), c. 49 (C.C.S.M., c. B63).
110 The Manitoba statute provided that a qualified medical practitioner who had
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a person whom he was treating had, within
the previous two hours, been driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, could seize
blood from that person. However, because provinces have no jurisdiction to legislate with
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case was therefore whether evidence of the sample should have
been excluded under section 24(2). Justice Lamer, for the Court,
ruled in favour of such exclusion. Given the state of the Criminal
Code at that time, it is hardly surprising that no consideration
appears to have been given to finding some sort of common law
authority for what was done.
Although in Dyment section 237(2) of the Criminal Code was
also in force at the relevant time, both the facts and the position
taken by the Crown were somewhat different. There, the physician
held a vial under Mr. Dyment's free-flowing wound in order to
collect a blood sample for medical purposes. Moreover, the police
officer who attended the accident scene did not request a sample,
nor when he came to the hospital did he know that one had been
taken. Dyment subsequently told the doctor that he had consumed
a beer and some antihistamine tablets. When the doctor spoke to
the police officer, he handed over the sample. The Crown argued
that this was not a seizure and, if it was, that it was not
unreasonable.
In two separate sets of reasons, the majority (6:1) ruled against
the Crown and excluded the evidence. The gist of the ruling is that
patients in hospital have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This
includes the expectation that their blood will be used for diagnostic
purposes and will not be given to strangers for non-medical reasons.
Accordingly, the doctor could not give the blood to the police to be
used as evidence in a criminal prosecution unless required to do so
by law. Any law that purported to require this would also be
subject to Charter scrutiny. There was no search, but by accepting
the sample the police seized it within the meaning of section 8 of
the Charter. This seizure, in the absence of compelling reasons,
violated the personal autonomy of Mr. Dyment. To admit evidence
obtained so unreasonably would bring the administration of justice
into disrepute.
respect to criminal law matters, it is highly doubtful that the Crown could rely upon this
authority. There are now detailed provisions in the Criminal Code (sections 254 and 256) for
taking blood samples from persons suspected of impaired driving. This may have influenced
the Supreme Court's decision in Dyment, supra, note 33.
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No mention is made in Dyment of the leading United States
Supreme Court decision on this issue."' Schmerber involved a
blood sample taken by a physician at the request of the police and
after the defendent, on the advice of counsel, had objected. The
United States Supreme Court, after rejecting (5:4) defence
arguments based upon the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, approached
the question much as the Canadian Court would do twenty years
later in Pohoretsky and Dyment, that is, as a Fourth Amendment
search and seizure case. However, it noted that "the values
protected by the Fourth Amendment ... substantially overlap those
the Fifth Amendment helps to protect. 112  It then held that
individuals have a privacy interest in their bodies, but that it was not
unreasonable to require suspects to submit to involuntary blood tests
in this sort of situation. Because the percentage of alcohol in the
blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, and because
the police took time to investigate the accident and to bring the
accused to the hospital, the officer faced an exigent situation. If he
did not act, the evidence would be lost. Furthermore, the procedure
was an accepted one and was carried out in a reasonable manner by
a trained physician in a hospital: "The extraction of blood samples
for tests is a highly effective means of determining the degree to
which a person is under the influence of alcohol."1 3 Thus, what
had been done was no more intrusive than was reasonably necessary.
ill Schmerber, supra, note 64. Mention is not even made by the sole dissenting justice,
McIntyre, J., who held that the only seizure was by the doctor and that admitting the evidence
would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Schmerber was, however, referred
to by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Pohoretsky (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 104 at 118ff. and,
without comment, by the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court - but not the Appellate
Division - in D)vnent (1984), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 531 at 538 (P.E.I.S.C.); (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d)
120 (P.E.I. S.C., App. Div.). Both the Manitoba Court of Appeal and the Prince Edward
Island Supreme Court ruled that the seizures violated sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, and in
Prince Edward Island the evidence was excluded. In Manitoba, however, it was admitted
notwithstanding the violation.
112 Ibid. at 767. The Fifth Amendment argument was rejected because blood samples
were not evidence "of a testimonial or communicative nature." The Sixth Amendment was also
of no assistance. As Justice Brennan put it, since Schmerber "was not entitled to assert the
privilege [against self-incrimination], he has no greater right because counsel erroneously
advised him that he could assert it." Ibid. at 765-66.
113 Ibid. at 771.
[VOL. 28. No. 4
Ties That Bind?
Like the Supreme Court of Canada in Pohoretsky, the American
Court found that the police had probable cause to believe that
Schmerber had been driving under the influence of alcohol and that
they had directed the physician to extract blood from a suspect who
did not, or could not, consent. Unlike the Canadian Court, the
justices in Schmerber found the search/seizure reasonable and the
evidence admissible. Even more striking is the comparison with
Dyment. There, the doctor acted on his own for medical purposes,
without physically invading the suspect's body at all. Yet, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that, in seizing the vial of blood for
non-medical purposes, the police "seriously" violated Dyment's
personal autonomy and "infringed upon all the spheres of privacy ...
spatial, personal and informational. 1 14  Clearly, the two Courts
differ sharply on the nature and degree of the expectation of privacy
involved. Years after it decided Schmerber, the United States
Supreme Court continues to regard blood tests as commonplace,
holding that they "do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition
on an individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity.
115
114 Dyment, supra, note 33 at 261, per La Forest, J., who had earlier identified these
three "spheres" by referring to Privacy and Computers, the report of the Task Force established
by the federal Departments of Justice and Communications (1972). It is noteworthy that
Justice La Forest made no reference to Schmerber, supra, note 64 in Dyment. A week earlier,
he had cited it in R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 at 79 [hereinafter Beare
cited to C.C.C.] as a leading case on "the much broader provision of the Fifth Amendment
against self-incrimination in the United States Constitution." Schmerber had also been referred
to in one of the lower courts. See supra, note 111.
115 Wiston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 at 762 (1984) in which the Court held that, in certain
circumstances, surgery to remove a bullet for evidentiary purposes can be a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Compare the pre-Charter Canadian case of R. v. Laporte (1972), 8
C.C.C. (2d) 343 (Que. Q.B.). There, it was held that because the Criminal Code authorized
warrants to search only a "building, receptacle or place," a warrant authorizing the surgical
removal of a bullet from the accused's body had to be quashed.
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2. Search, Seizure, and the Right to Counsel
The American Court would also disagree with the majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in Simmons that a failure to
advise suspects of their right to counsel under section 10(b) affects
the reasonableness of a search under section 8.116 It will be
remembered that in Simmons the Court, following United States
precedent, held that border searches constitute an exception to the
general rule because the expectation of privacy at border crossings
is necessarily lower. The majority also ruled that persons subjected
to strip searches at Customs are detained within section 10(b) and
must be read their right to counsel.11 7 As this was not done in
Simmons, the majority was of the view that, although the law
authorizing the search did not violate section 8, the manner in which
the search was carried out did. Chief Justice Dickson reasoned that,
if Simmons had been informed of her right to counsel and had
availed herself of that right, much of the uncertainty concerning the
authority for the search would have been clarified. As he put it,
"the denial of the appellant's right to counsel cannot avoid having an
impact upon the reasonableness of the subsequent search of the
116 Simmons, supra, note 20 at 322. Compare the even stronger position taken by
Wilson, J. in her concurring judgments in Simmons at 327-28, R. v. Jacoy, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548,
45 C.C.C. (3d) 46 at 55 [hereinafter Jacoy cited to C.C.C.], and R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 980, 46 C.C.C. 479 at 503. In all three cases, the evidence obtained in violation of the
Charter was nonetheless admitted, because to do so would not "bring the administration of
justice into disrepute." [Since this was written, a majority of the Court appears to have gone
even further down this path. See P?. v. Greffe, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 161, in
which the evidence was excluded.]
117 Sections 143 and 144 of the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-40 authorize a customs
officer to search any person if the officer has reasonable cause to suppose that the person has
goods subject to entry at customs or prohibited goods secreted about his person. They also
provide that before anyone can be searched, he or she may ask to be taken before a
magistrate, justice of the peace, or chief officer at the port. These sections were posted on
a wall and Simmons' attention was directed to them. However, there was no evidence that
she read them, and they were not read to her.
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appellant. 1'1 8  He therefore found the search to be in violation of
section 8, but admitted the evidence anyway.1 19
Not all the justices agreed with this analysis. Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 dissented, as she did in Ross.1 20 There, she argued
that line-up evidence does not "emanate" from the accused "in the
same way that a confession does," thus rejecting the majority's
contention that line-ups could be brought within the Collins
principle:
121
The identity of the accused existed prior to the violation, as did the perceptions of
the witnesses to the crime. In my view, such evidence comes into existence when an
accused is seen committing the crime. The evidence cannot be considered as
"emanating" from the accused simply because it may later be used to establish the
credibility of identification evidence.
1 2 2
In Simmons, which was in fact decided a few weeks earlier, she took
a similar line, holding that the right to counsel "is primarily aimed at
preventing the accused or detained person from incriminating
herself."1 23  Thus, "the main concern would be with coerced or
uninformed confessions. In such circumstances, the accused would
be manufacturing the evidence against herself. ... However, [at] a
118 Simmons, supra, note 20 at 322.
119 It would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute to do so. See section
24(2) of the Charter.
120 Ross, supra, note 92. Compare Justice L'Heureux-Dub's dissent in R. v. Duguay,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 93, 46 C.C.C. (3d) 1 [hereinafter Duguay cited to C.C.C.] where the issue was
the admissibility of both real evidence and statements secured by the police after they had
arbitrarily detained the accused.
121 Ross, supra, note 92 at 141. See also, supra, note 99 and accompanying text at 756.
Justice L'Heureux-Dubd cites Leon, supra, note 18 in Duguay, supra, note 120 at 28, but
neglects to refer to such cases as Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) [hereinafter Brown]
which held that a confession obtained subsequent to an arrest made without probable cause
should be excluded, notwithstanding that the defendent had been Mirandized.
122 Ross, supra, note 92 at 141. Justice Lamer, for the majority, agreed that line-up
evidence does not emanate from the accused, but held that an accused who takes part in a
line-up "is participating in the construction of credible inculpating evidence." Ibid. at 139.
Compare Chief Justice Dickson's statement in Jacoy, supra, note 116 at 50, where he justified
admitting evidence of narcotics obtained as a result of an illegal search. Such evidence, he
said, exists "independently of the Charter violation," unlike the breath sample in Therens, supra,
note 27, which "was created by the accused as a result of the violation."
123 Simnons, supra, note 20 at 331.
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customs search ... [s]he is not being interrogated; she is merely being
searched. 124  In her view, the search was not conducted in an
unreasonable manner, so there was no need to consider the
admissibility issue.
American jurisprudence was cited on the question of border
searches generally, but not on this point, not even by the dissent.
In fact, it supports Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's view. An otherwise
reasonable search will not be held unlawful simply because the
police failed to advise an individual of his right to counsel. The
reasonableness of the search hinges upon the language of the
Fourth Amendment and the behaviour of the police, not upon the
implied right to counsel in the Fifth Amendment, nor the explicit
right in the Sixth. s25 Certainly, the Court will exclude evidence
which was seized as a result of obtaining an unconstitutional
confession (the so-called "fruit of the poisoned tree"), but that is not
the same as invalidating an otherwise lawful search simply because
the police failed to warn a suspect of his right to counsel.126
Indeed, in many situations, there is no right to such a warning under
United States law.
1 27
124 Ibid. at 331-32.
125 On the other hand, a proper reading of the defendant's Miranda rights will not
remedy a Fourth Amendment violation. See Brown, supra, note 121. There is, according to
the Supreme Court, a difference between the purpose behind excluding evidence for Fourth,
as opposed to Fifth, Amendment violations. The latter is to deter compelled confessions;
the former is to deter unconstitutional searches and seizures, whether they produce
incriminating evidence or not. In practice, of course, the two amendments tend to coalesce
because there is often a close relationship between the search and subsequent statements.
See inf-a, note 126 and accompanying text at 766.
126 The "fruit of the poisoned tree" doctrine is activated by the violation of a
constitutional norm. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). However, if
Miranda is merely a procedural guarantee, the doctrine may not be as strong as first supposed.
See supra, note 61. In a number of decisions, the Court has refused to apply it to derivative
evidence where, although the police failed to give the Miranda warning, there was no
constitutional violation, that is, the sort of actual compulsion contemplated by the Fifth
Amendment. For example, in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) it was held that a
failure to read the Miranda warning will not necessarily render inadmissible the testimony of
a witness found as a result. And in Elstad, supra, note 61, the Court ruled that a failure to
read the warning before an otherwise uncoerced confession will not render a second
confession, voluntarily made after a warning, inadmissible.
127 See, for example, Berkemer, supra, note 84, and the cases listed supra, note 64.
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C. Self-incrimination and the Prior Testimony of the Accused
In all of the cases examined so far, at least two of the three
basic ideas identified at the beginning of this section, the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to be secure against unreasonable
search and seizure, and the right to counsel, have been relevant. In
two Supreme Court of Canada decisions, however, the Court dealt
with one of these ideas, the privilege against self-incrimination, in
relative isolation.
In the first case, Dubois, the accused testified and was
convicted, but won a new trial on appeal. 12 On this re-trial, the
Crown entered, as part of its case, Dubois' testimony at the first
trial. Dubois objected to this unsuccessfully, electing not to testify
in response. Although using the testimony of an accused at his first
trial was standard practice prior to the Charter, the Supreme Court
held (6:1) that it now violated section 13, which provides, in part, as
follows: "A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right
not to have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate
that witness in any other proceedings." Holding that the re-trial
was an "other proceeding" for the purposes of this section, Justice
Lamer invoked Dubois' section 11(c) right not to testify and his
11(d) right to be presumed innocent in aid of this result. He
reasoned that these provisions made it clear that the purpose of
section 13 is to prevent an accused from being "conscripted" to help
the Crown discharge its burden of establishing a "case to meet." In
his words:
To allow the prosecution to use, as part of its case, the accused's previous testimony
would, in effect, allow the Crown to do indirectly what it is estopped from doing
directly by s.11(c), i.e., to compel the accused to testify. It would also permit an
indirect violation of the right of the accused to be presumed innocent and remain silent
until proven guilty by the prosecution, as guaranteed by s.11(d) of the Charter.129
128 Supra, note 99.
129 Ibid. at 537-38. Sections 11(c) and (d) provide, in part, that anyone "charged with
an offence has the right ... not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that
person in respect of the offence ... [and] to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
according to law."
1990]
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The result is that an accused, who makes a "voluntary" statement in
a police station after being read his rights and who chooses to testify
at his trial, can prevent the prosecution from using his testimony
against him at a new trial, but not the unsworn statement made to
the police. A year later, the Court went further, holding that this
sort of prior testimony cannot even be used to cross-examine the
accused at his re-trial.130
Because these cases turned largely upon section 13 of the
Charter, a provision that reflects Canada's unique approach to the
privilege against self-incrimination, comparing their results with the
American position is tricky.131 However, it would seem that, in the
United States, Dubois would have been regarded as having waived
his privilege by testifying. His earlier testimony would be
inadmissible only if it could be shown that he felt compelled to
testify at his first trial in order to respond to evidence, such as a
coerced confession, that was wrongly introduced by the
prosecution. 3 2
The importance of Dubois lies in Justice Lamer's notion of
"conscription." Coupled with his position in Collins, which tends to
lump confessions and "other evidence emanating" from the accused
together, it points the way to a vigorous, new life for the privilege
130 Mannion v. R (1987), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 272, 28 C.C.C. (3d) 544. Appellate courts
have differed as to whether Mannion constitutes a complete bar to cross-examination or
continues to permit it where the object is simply to discredit the accused rather than show
actual evidence of guilt. See, for example, R v. Kuldip (1988), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 11 (Ont. C.A.),
and, contra, Re Johnstone and Law Society of British Columbia (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 550
(B.C.C.A.) and R v. W.D.B. (1987), 38 C.C.C. (3d) 12 (Sask. C.A.). Based upon the reasons
given by the Court in Mannion, the former would appear to be the correct view. The issue
is discussed more fully in D.M. Paciocco, "Self-Incrimination: Removing the Coffin Nails"
(1989) 35 McGill L.J. 73.
131 In Britain and the United States, a witness may refuse to answer a question on the
ground that to answer would tend to incriminate. In Canada, this privilege was abolished by
statute in the late nineteenth century, and the predecessor of section 5 of the Canada
Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10 and section 13 of the Charter were substituted. It provided
that the witness, including an accused if he chooses to testify, must answer, but the answer
cannot be used against him in any other proceedings.
1 3 2 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
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against self-incrimination in Canada.133 Although a final assessment
must await a detailed examination of the role of the exclusionary
rule contained in section 24(2) of the Charter, cases such as Ross,
Pohoretsky, Dyment, and Simmons are clearly significant.1 34 They
show that the trend that began with Dubois has already led the
Supreme Court of Canada to extend protections to accused persons
that, at least in the situations examined in this article, go
significantly beyond those developed by the Warren, Burger, and
now Rehnquist Courts in the United States.
D. A Substantive Example: Felony-Murder
Although this article is concerned primarily with procedural
rights, some mention must be made of a striking development in
Canadian substantive criminal law. 35 As stated earlier, the Supreme
Court of Canada decided in the Motor Vehicle Reference to discount
evidence that the framers of the Charter intended to confine section
7 to so-called procedural violations! 36  This meant that the Court
was prepared to review the substance of legislation as well as to
monitor procedural flaws. Invoking this authority in Morgentaler and
133 See Paciocco, supra, note 130. These developments may account in part for the
reservations expressed by Justice LeDain in his separate, concurring judgment in Collins, supra,
note 12 at 23, where he said that he was concerned about the "possible implications [of
Justice Lamer's reasoning] for such matters as self-incrimination." [It may have been
reservations such as these that account, in part, for the different views expressed in Thompson
Newspapers, supra, addendum to note 44, which was decided after this text was written.]
134 Only in Simmons, supra, note 20 was the impugned evidence admitted, and the
combination of sections 10(b) and 24(2) seems to have produced an exclusionary rule every
bit as vigorous as that associated with Miranda. In 'The Charter Right to Counsel: Beyond
Miranda" (1987), 25 Alta. L. Rev. 190 at 191-92, Peter Michalyshyn makes a similar point.
He states that "arrest or detention" has been substituted for "custodial interrogation" as a
touchstone for the right against self-incrimination. It is our thesis that it is the Supreme
Court of Canada's broad interpretation of this substitution that has carried us well beyond
the American jurisprudence.
135 On the effect of the Charter in this area generally, see B.P. Archibald, '"he
Constitutionalization of the General Part of Criminal Law" (1988), 67 Can. B. Rev. 403.
136 Supra, note 16 at 297-307. Justice Lamer justly criticized the substantive/procedural
dichotomy, dismissing it as "largely bound up in the American" experience. He did this,
however, not to shy away from the bottomless pit of what Americans call substantive due
process, but to justify, at least in criminal cases, jumping in head first.
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Vaillancourt, it proceeded to strike down two important sections of
the Criminal Code.137 While it is Morgentaler, the abortion law
decision, that has attracted all the public attention, it is, in fact,
Vaillancourt that represents the greater departure from precedent.
At issue in Vaillancourt was the notorious felony-murder rule.
The accused argued that it was unconstitutional because it violated
both sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. The Supreme Court
agreed. What was then section 213(d) of the Criminal Code
provides, in part, as follows:
[W]here a person causes the death of a human being while committing ... robbery, [he
is guilty of murder] whether or not [he] means to cause death ... and whether or not
he knows death is likely to be caused to any human being, if ... he uses a weapon or
has it on his person ... at the time he commits the offence ... and the death ensues as
a consequence.
The rule is a severe one, especially in this Canadian version.
Thomas Macaulay, Chairman of the first Indian Law Commission,
did not include the rule in his Indian Penal Code in 1838.138 A
number of jurisdictions, including the Parliament of Great Britain in
1957, have abolished it. The Canadian Parliament, however, not
only did not follow suit, but actually made the rule even more
draconian. The courts had no authority to challenge this
development prior to 1982. It is to be questioned whether the
framers of the Charter intended that this should be any different
afterwards.
The facts of Vaillancourt are straightforward. He and an
accomplice decided to rob a poolroom and agreed to arm themselves
with knives. When the accomplice arrived and produced a gun,
Vaillancourt objected because he was afraid of an accidental
discharge. The accomplice therefore removed three bullets from the
gun and Vaillancourt put them in his glove, where the authorities
subsequently found them.139 During the robbery, the accomplice
137 Supra, note 11.
138 A Penal Code Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners (London: Pelham,
Richardson, Cornhill, 1838) at 110.
139 The decision of the Quebec C.A. in R. v. Vaillancourt (1984), [1987] 31 C.C.C. (3d)
75, reveals that the bullets fell out of Vaillancourt's glove in front of the jurors: "It seems,"
wrote McCarthy J.A.,"that they were not particularly impressed by this" Ibid. at 81.
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went to the back of the poolroom, became involved in a struggle
with a customer and shot him. Vaillancourt testified that he had
been certain that the gun was unloaded. It is true that he could
have been lying, but his accomplice was never caught so there was
no real possibility of contradiction. On this evidence, it was difficult
for the prosecution to prove that Vaillancourt had the necessary
mens rea to be a party to murder, so they relied upon the
felony-murder doctrine. Because he had not been the one with the
weapon, they had to do this by invoking section 21(2) of the
Criminal Code, which, coupled with section 213(4), made him as
guilty as the man who actually pulled the trigger.
14
The Supreme Court ruled that section 213(d), in effect,
imposed absolute liability upon Vaillancourt for murder, an offence
carrying a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Because the
Court had already decided in the Motor Vehicle Reference that
absolute liability plus even the possibility of imprisonment violated
the section 7 guarantee of security of the person, Vaillancourt's
conviction could only stand if section 213(d) could be construed as
a reasonable limit. The Court held that it could not. Moreover,
the section also violated the presumption of innocence. In Oakes,
the Court had cited United States authority to conclude that
unreasonable reverse onus clauses violated section 11(d) of the
Charter1 41 In Vaillancourt, they reasoned that a law that did not
actually reverse the onus of proof, but which removed the
prosecution's obligation of proving an essential element of the
offence, was just as repugnant. As Justice Lamer put it:
[B]efore an accused can be convicted of an offence, the trier of fact must be satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of all of the essential elements of the offence.
140 Section 21(2) provides that "[w]here two or more persons form an intention in
common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of
them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of'them who knew or
ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence
of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence." Unlike s.213(d), s.21(2)
requires at least objective foreseeability.
141 In Oakes, supra, note 21, the Court struck down section 8 of the federal Narcotic
ControlAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1. This section provided that, once the prosecution had proved
that a person charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking had been in possession
of a narcotic, the onus of proof shifted to him to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that
he did not possess it for that purpose.
1990]
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These essential elements include not only those set out by the legislature in the
provision creating the offence but also those required by s. 7 of the Charter. Any
provision creating an offence which allows for the conviction of an accused
notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable doubt on any essential element infringes
ss. 7 and 11(d).1 4 2
Sections 7 and 11(d) will also be infringed where the statutory definition of the offence
does not include an element which is required under s.7 ... [W]hat offends the
presumption of innocence is the fact that an accused may be convicted despite the
existence of a reasonable doubt on an essential element of the offence, and I do not
think that it matters whether this results from the existence of a reverse onus provision
or from the elimination of the need to prove an essential element!
4 3
What was the essential element that was missing in a murder charge
based upon section 213(d)? According to Justice Lamer, the section
permitted conviction for murder even where the death was not
objectively foreseeable. This element of objective foreseeability was
the minimum mens rea required by the constitution for a murder
conviction. 144 Indeed, Justice Lamer and at least three others
indicated that they would go even further in the next case and hold
that subjective foresight was the minimum requirement, thus placing
even more Criminal Code provisions in jeopardy.145
What this of course amounts to is a constitutionalization of the
doctrine of mens rea or, rather, of a version of it. The Court has
sent a clear signal to Parliament that, under the constitution, murder
is an offence which requires, at the very least, that the prosecution
prove objective foresight.1 46  In support, Justice Lamer cited two
decisions from American state courts, People v. Aaron1 47 and State
142 Vaillancourt, supra, note 11 at 126.
143 Ibid. at 135.
144 Ibid. at 134.
145 In fact, the Ontario Court of Appeal recently relied upon Justice Lamer's reasons
to hold that the phrase "or ought to have known" in section 21(2) must be "read down" when
a party is charged with attempted murder or murder as defined in what is now section 229(a).
See R v. Logan (1989), 46 C.C.C. (3d) 354 (Ont. C.A.) and R v. Harris (1989), 48 C.C.C.
(3d) 521 (Ont. C.A.). Compare R v. Collins (1989), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 343 (Ont. C.A.) and R
v. Arkell (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 402 (B.C.C.A.).
146 More generally, it also gave notice that Parliament cannot avoid the sterilizing effects
of the Oakes decision, supra, note 21 by deleting an offence's mens rea requirement along with
its offending reverse onus clause.
147 299 N.W. 2d 304 (1980) [hereinafter Aaron].
v. Doucette,148 describing them as abolishing the felony-murder rule
in their respective states. However, he neglected to add that neither
did so on constitutional grounds. State courts which have
considered the rule have, instead, limited its application. They have
done so either by requiring proof of a direct causal connection
between the perpetrator and the act or by compelling the
prosecution to prove mens rea, rather than relying upon a
presumption. They did not so by constitutionalizing mens rea.
In Aaron, the Supreme Court of Michigan required the
prosecution to prove malice, saying that they were exercising their
"role in the development of the common-law by abrogating the
common law felony-murder rule."149 But before doing so, Justice
Fitzgerald pointedly noted that Michigan had no statutory rule 50
If it had, they might have resorted to the principles of statutory
interpretation to limit the doctrine, as the Supreme Court of
Vermont did in Doucette. There, the statute read, in part, that
murder "committed in perpetrating ... robbery ... shall be murder in
the first degree."151  The defence argued, much as Vaillancourt
would do, that the provision violated both the State and the Federal
Constitutions' guarantees of due process. However, this argument
proved unnecessary once the Court ruled that, by using the term
"murder" rather than "killings," the legislature had intended to
require the prosecution to prove malice.
152
Although it may well be that the United States Supreme Court
would follow the Canadian Court's lead and strike down a
felony-murder rule that could not be interpreted away, there are at
least two reasons why this would be more difficult than it was in
Vaillancourt. In the first place, jurisdiction over criminal law in the
United States belongs primarily to the states. A substantive issue
such as this one does not fit easily within the usual categories of
review. The only obvious pigeon-hole is the one argued in Doucette,
148 470 A.2d 676 (1983) [hereinafter Doucette].
149 Aaron, supra, note 147 at 329.
150 Ibid. at 328-29.
151 Doucette, supra, note 148 at 682.
152 Ibid.
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that is, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
substantive interpretations of that provision are the black hole of
Supreme Court jurisprudence 53 Secondly, some time ago the
United States Court expressed its reluctance to arrogate to itself
such expansive powers of review. As Justice Marshall put it in
Powell v. Texas, that Court has "never articulated a general
constitutional doctrine of mens rea,"154 and it was simply "not yet
the time to write into our Constitution formulas cast in terms whose
meaning ... is not yet clear."155 Perhaps, with the Supreme Court
of Canada leading the way, that time will come sooner rather than
later.
Most of the signs, however, suggest otherwise. In Patterson v.
New York, decided some nine years after Powell and only two years
after a decision that many took as heralding a more activist stance
in this area, the United States Supreme Court upheld a law that
shifted the burden of proof by deleting an element of the offence
and reinserting it as an affirmative defence! 56  Although the Court
stated that "there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which
153 On the general question of state jurisdiction over criminal law and the reluctance of
the United States Supreme Court to constitutionalize substantive criminal law, see A.
Saltzman, "Strict Liability and the United States Constitution: Substantive Criminal Law Due
Process" (1978), 24 Wayne L. Rev. 1571. Reverse onus clauses have certainly been struck
down in the United States as violating the presumption of innocence (which is read into the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments), and some of these decisions are referred to in axkes,
supra, note 21 at 341-42. In appropriate cases, due process can also be coupled with the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See, for example,
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
154 392 U.S. 514 (1968) at 535 [hereinafter Powell].
155 Ibid. at 537.
156 432 U.S. 197 (1977) [hereinafter Patterson]. The case, decided two years earlier, that
seemed to point in another direction, is Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) [hereinafter
Mullaney], where the Court held that the requirements of due process include, in a murder
case, that the prosecution prove malice and the absence of such affirmative defences as
provocation, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is this sort of sequence that has prompted some
commentators to conclude that the question "of the existence of constitutional constraints on
the substantive criminal law [in the United States] is largely terra in-cognita," even though the
courts there have had over two hundred years to address it. See J.C. Jeffries & P.B. Stephan,
"Defences, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law" (1979), 88 Yale LJ. 1325
at 1366, quoted in Charles, Cromwell & Jobson, supra, note 20 at 183. In contrast, it took
the Supreme Court of Canada only three years (the Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 16)
or, at most, five years (Vaillancourt, supra, note 11).
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the States may not go," the decison implies that legislators can
usually avoid such limits, whatever these may be, by deleting and
substituting elements of the offence. 157  It is unclear what this
means in terms of the probability of substantive criminal law in the
United States being constitutionalized. Professor Fletcher is
probably correct in reading the decision as being about respect for
"the independent evolution of state systems of criminal law," rather
than an endorsement of the legislation in question. He goes on to
suggest, however, that the reluctance of the Court can also be
justified in the way Justice Marshall did in Powell. As he puts it,
the "retreat" in Patterson
is not a setback, but a recognition that the Supreme Court cannot undertake to specify
the principles that bind the states in the ongoing process of law reform. The aim of
criminal theory should not be the working out of principles for the Supreme Court to
enact as the mandate to the Constitution, but to refine the criteria of just punishment
as an intermediate body of theory. There is room in our system of justice for a set of
principles below the Constitution, but higher than the rules of positive law.
1 5 8
The question for Canadians is whether the fact that the criminal
law in Canada is federal, rather than provincial, is sufficiently
important to override the arguments of those who counsel restraint.
The Supreme Court would appear to believe that it is. In
Vaillancourt, the justices were provided with the perfect case to
make the point.
157 Ibid. at 210. When the Supreme Court of Canada came to consider this sort of
issue, they did not refer to Patterson. See Oakes, Holmes, Wiyte, and Schwartz (Appendix I,
infra at 784).
158 G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Toronto: Little Brown, 1978) at 551-52.
"Retreat" refers to the contrast with such cases as Mullaney, supra, note 156. Fletcher calls
Patterson, supra, note 156 an "about-face," but seems willing to stand behind it. Ibid. at 55.
'The task of re-thinking the criminal law requires constant criticism and debate," he argues,
and to "incorporate transient results in the Constitution is both to confess the failure of an
intermediate body of theory and to stunt the process of debate and development" Ibid. at
552. Compare the rather different approach of C.P. Erlinder, "Mens Rea, Due Process and
the Supreme Court: Toward a Constitutional Doctrine of Substantive Criminal Law" (1981)
9 Am. . Crim. L. 163.
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E. Some Counter-examples
It would not do to close here and risk leaving the impression
that the Supreme Court of Canada cites United States authority only
when convenient, or that it has always gone further in protecting
the interests of the accused than its American counterpart. In
Hufsky, for example, it specifically rejected the American Supreme
Court's condemnation of random motor vehicle spot-checks,
notwithstanding that its own pre-Charter case law required it to hold
such stops a violation of section 9 of the Charter.
1 5 9
The Court was faced with the United States Supreme Court
decision in Delaware v. Prouse, where police found marijuana in an
automobile they had stopped to determine whether the driver had
a licence. 6° Balancing the state's interest in safe highways against
the driver's Fourth Amendment right to privacy, the American Court
held that the former could be protected in a less intrusive manner
than by arbitrary and random stops of individual motorists and that
state laws authorizing such practices were unconstitutional.161 The
Canadian Supreme Court, on the other hand, relied upon extensive
material presented by the prosecution that was designed to show
how difficult it was to detect impaired drivers without using such
stops and which referred to other democratic societies - with the
notable exception of the United States - which gave police officers
this authority 6 2 Justice Le Dain, writing for a unanimous Court,
referred to Prouse, but he neither described nor analyzed it.
Instead, he simply concluded that Canadian law enforcement efforts
in this area should not "be subjected to the kinds of conditions or
restrictions reflected in the American jurisprudence, ... which would
159 Supra, note 30. Section 9 provides that "[e]veryone has the, right not to be arbitrarily
detained or imprisoned," and the pre-Charter case of R v. Dednan (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2,
20 C.C.C. (3d) 97 accepted that such stops were arbitrary. The majority, however, found
common law authority for them.
160 440 U.S. 648 (1979) [hereinafter Prouse].
161 One alternative that the Court suggested was that the police establish roadblocks at
which all motorists were stopped. [Since this was written, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld
just such a roadblock. See Michigan Dep't of Police v. Sitz, 110 L Ed. 2d 412 (1990).]
162 A similar argument was made and accepted in Thomsen, supra, note 83.
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appear seriously to undermine its effectiveness while not significantly
reducing its intrusiveness. ' 163 He accordingly upheld the provincial
law, pursuant to which the stop was made, as a reasonable limit
upon Hufsky's section 9 right not to be arbitrarily detained. In
rejecting Prouse, the Supreme Court of Canada seems therefore to
have restricted the concept of privacy to section 8 of the Charter.
164
In the United States, on the other hand, the Supreme Court regards
the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as
extending to the subject matter of both sections 8 and 9, that is, to
detentions and arrests as well as to searches.1 65
Hufsky appears to be the only case in which the Supreme Court
of Canada has explicitly rejected a decision of its American
counterpart in this area which favoured the interests of the accused.
However, there are many other Canadian cases where the Court
referred to United States authority to make rulings that do not
protect the accused as much as, or any more than, American law
does. In Beare, for example, the Court rejected a battery of
arguments, some of which had been accepted by the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal, designed to show that fingerprinting accused
persons prior to conviction violated the Charter. Some American
precedent was cited in support.166 In R. v. Corbett, the Court
refused to strike down section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act, which
imposes no restrictions upon the prosecution's right to cross-examine
an accused person on his criminal record, even where (as in Corbett
itself) both the charge and the previous conviction are murder.
1 67
163 Hufsky, supra, note 30 at 409-10. Justice LeDain also referred to Little v. State, 479
A.2d 903 (1984). [Since this was written, the Court has gone even farther in protecting
random stops. See R. v. Ladouceur (1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 22. (S.C.C.).]
164 Later, in Beare, supra, note 114 at 77, the Court expressed "sympathy" for the idea
that section 7 also protected privacy interests.
165 However, there are two standards of detention under the Fourth Amendment:
probable cause and reasonable suspicion. The latter represents a significantly lower standard
and is respresented by such cases as Montoya de Hernandez, supra, note 106, Teny, supra, note
86, and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
166 See supra, note 114.
167 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, 41 C.C.C. 385 [hereinafter Corbett cited to C.C.C.]. Canada
Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10. Section 12 provides that a "witness may be questioned"
about prior convictions. It makes no distinction between an ordinary witness and an accused.
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Although the majority did hold that trial judges would in future
enjoy a discretion to exclude where the mechanical application of
the section would lead to injustice, this is no more generous to the
accused than the United States Federal Rules of Evidence, and
arguably less so/68 Some American authority was referred to, but
as the sole dissenting judge suggested, the position in the United
States "is not free from controversy."169 In Oakes, the Court cited
American law in support of its approach to reverse onus clauses.
1 70
In Rahey, it did so in aid of its interpretation of section 11(b) of the
Charter, which guarantees accused persons the right to be tried
within a reasonable time 71 Other examples could be cited.
IV. CONCLUSION
Still, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that, Hufsky excepted,
there is a tendency in the Court to cite United States law when it
helps or, at least, does not stand in the way of a result it wishes to
reach, but not otherwise 72 Certainly, that is what has been done,
thus far, in a number of cases involving traffic stops, line-ups, breath
and blood samples, and the use of the accused's prior testimony.
Thus, Therens makes no mention of Berkemer; Ross contains no
reference to Kirby; Dubois does not consider Harrison; and Dyment
168 See 28 USCS Appendix, Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 609(a). Corbett, supra, note
167 overrules R v. Stratton (1978), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 449 (Ont. C.A.), which held that the
wording of section 12 meant that trial judges had no discretion on this issue.
169 Corbett, supra, note 167 at 437.
170 supra, note 21.
171 Supra, note 30. See also Mills, supra, note 27. These are difficult cases to classify
because of the number and variety of the judgments. In Rahey, for example, the eight justices
delivered four separate judgments on the unreasonable delay issue, and American authority
is referred to in only two of them. Basically, the Court appears to have adapted the American
precedents for Charter purposes. Justice Lamer (Dickson, CJ., concurring) agreed with the
United States Supreme Court that a balancing test was needed, but differed "on the elements
... and the factors which are to be weighed in that test." Ibid. at 302.
172 Nor have the dissenters made effective use of American precedent to buttress their
views. Moreover, sometimes the American law that is cited is not quite as relevant as it is
made to appear. For discussions of Clarkson and Vaillancourt, see above, sections III.A.1.
and III.D., supra at 760ff. and 776ff respectively.
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ignores Schmerber. Again, more examples could be cited, but the
latter is especially interesting because Dyment does refer to other,
rather peripheral, American authority and because Schmerber was
referred to by the trial court in that case. Moreover, it had also
been cited by one of the Supreme Court of Canada justices in Beare
just a week earlier
1 73
The Court's somewhat selective approach to United States
jurisprudence is matched by its relatively consistent commitment to
liberal values. It is true that the Court has not yet extended section
10(b) to cover the full range of Miranda warnings, but by not
reading the American limitations on Miranda into the section, the
Court has given it a force that, in some important respects, exceeds
that of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.1 74 Whereas Miranda is
triggered by custodial interrogation, section 10(b) applies whenever
an individual is detained. Therefore, Canadian police must warn
earlier in the process than their American counterparts. Further,
the right to counsel in the Fifth Amendment is confined to
protecting the privilege against self-incrimination through testimonial
evidence. The warning required by 10(b) is not so limited and is
required even where the sole issue is the admissibility of
non-testimonial evidence, for example, a breathalzyer certificate.
Perhaps, most interesting of all is the Court's willingness to tie
sections 8 and 10(b) together. Declaring a search unreasonable
because of a failure to advise a detainee of his right to counsel is an
idea strange to American jurisprudence. Coupled with this is an
increasing divergence between the two Courts, originally very much
in line with each other, in their respective approaches to the
doctrine of privacy
1 75
173 See supra, notes 108 and 114.
174 We say "yet," because in practice police routinely advise suspects of their right to
silence, and because of the developments referred to in note 62, supra, which at the time of
writing were still only at the provincial appellate level.
175 For example, the contrast between Dyment and Schmerber and between Hufsky and
Prouse. See above, sections III.B.1. and III.E., supra at 32ff. and 48ff. respectively. On the
extent to which recent cases in the United States may be seen as narrowing the the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy set out in Katz, supra, note 42, see M. Campbell, "Defining A
Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence"
(1986) 61 Wash. L. Rev. 191.
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Why this has happened is not clear. The different wording and
organization of the Charter, coupled with the philosophical
orientation of three or four of the justices, are certainly important
factors 76 So, too, is the perception that it was judicial hostility to
the 1960 Bill of Rights that effectively sterilized that document.
Many of today's judges, it seems, have been influenced by nearly
three decades of academic and political support for American-style
rights review and do not wish to be accused of backing away from
the Charter in the way many of their predecessors backed away from
the Bill. As Justice Le Dain put it in the first Charter case in which
evidence was excluded pursuant to section 24(2):
In considering the relationship of a decision under the Canadian Bill of Rights to an
issue arising under the Charter, a court cannot, in my respectful opinion, avoid bearing
in mind an evident fact of Canadian judicial history, which must be squarely and frankly
faced: that on the whole, with some notable exceptions, the courts have felt some
uncertainty or ambivalence in the application of the Canadian Bill of Rights because
it did not reflect a clear constitutional mandate to make judicial decisions having the
effect of limiting or qualifying the traditional sovereignty of Parliament.
1 77
This pre- and post-Charter contrast is most clearly revealed in
the reasons of those judges, such as the present Chief Justice, who
had occasion to consider the nature and limits of judicial review
before the enactment of the Charter. For example, in R. v. Perka,
the facts of which arose prior to 1982, Dickson, J. (as he then was)
wrote that to ask the Court to expand the defence of necessity is
"to invite [the judges] to second-guess the Legislature and to assess
the relative merits of social polices underlying criminal prohibitions.
Neither is a role which fits well with the judicial function."178 Yet,
176 See supra, note 13 and accompanying text at 733. There have been several
retirements and resignations from the Court recently, and a number of important decisions
have therefore been rendered by benches of less than the full nine judges. For example, Ross,
supra, note 92 was a 4:2 decision. One justice who heard the case resigned before judgment
was given and therefore took no part, and two more have resigned since then. Only three
who were in the majority remain on the Court. The impact that new appointees will have
upon the Court's jurisprudence is as yet unclear.
177 Therens, supra, note 27 at 501. This reticence is discussed supra, note 7 and
accompanying text at 731ff.
178 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 385 at 398. Ironically, the Chief Justice relied
upon his reasons in the first, pre-Charter Morgentaler case, reported at (1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d)
449 (S.C.C.). He might also have referred to his reasons in Harrison v. Carswell, [1976] 2
S.C.R. 200, 25 C.C.C. (2d) 186, delivered in the course of restoring the conviction of a
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only a few years later, the Chief Justice joined with his colleagues
in striking down the abortion law and the felony-murder rule,179
declaring that he had "no doubt" that even "disputes of a political or
foreign policy nature" were now "cognizable by the courts."
180
There is also a tendency to justify this new approach in terms
of what, with respect, is an untenable distinction between policy and
law. Justice Lamer, for example, maintained in the Motor Vehicle
Reference that, although the Court had been given the power to
invalidate laws for violating the principles of fundamental justice
referred to in section 7, this did not mean that they could "decide
upon the appropriateness of policies underlying legislative
enactments" or "question their wisdom."181  Yet surely, this is
exactly what it means. The power to decide the content to be given
to such potentially broad guarantees as "fundamental justice" is
considerable, and the Court has not shrunk from it. How, after all,
can one can strike down the felony murder rule without
"second-guessing" the legislature about the "relative merits of social
policies underlying criminal prohibitions"?18 2
picketer for trespass. There, he described the process of weighing property rights against the
right to picket advocated by the dissent as raising "important and difficult political and
socio-economic issues, the resolution of which must ... be arbitrary and embody personal
economic and social beliefs' Ibid. at 200.
179 Morgentaler and Vaillancourt, supra, note 11.
180 Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 459.
181 Motor Vehicle Act Reference, supra, note 16 at 297 (the latter phrase is Chief Justice
Dickson's). Justice Lamer ruled that the principles of fundamental justice reflect "objective
and manageable standards" that "are to be found in the basic tenets and principles ... of our
legal system' Ibid. at 299 and 309. He does not refer to the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Rochin, supra, note 40, but he might well have. There, Justice Frankfurter wrote
that the 'vague contours of the Due Process clause do not leave judges at large" because the
limits of the concept of due process of law "are fused in the whole nature of our judicial
process." Ibid. at 170. However, he could not define due process "more precisely than to
say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice'"
Ibid. at 173.
182 Learned Hand made this same point in The Bill of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard, 1958) at 39. He did not, he wrote, "see how a court can invalidate [a legislative
choice of values] without ... declaring whether the legislature's [choice] is what the court would
have coined to meet the occasion' He added that judicial rhetoric to the contrary "does not
disguise the fact that [the court's choice] is an authentic exercise of the same process that
produced the statute'
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However, while these considerations may explain why the
Supreme Court has not backed away from the liberal and
interventionist possibilities presented by the Charter, they do not
explain why it has occasionally gone well beyond the United States
Supreme Court in protecting the interests of the accused, nor why
it has usually done so without referring to contrary American
precedent. It may be that the justices are overwhelmed by their
caseload and simply do not have the time to familiarize themselves
with this jurisprudence and its context. It may also be that, in some
cases, they have been influenced by developments that were likely,
in future cases, to limit the otherwise broad implications of their
approach.18 3 Whatever the reasons, proceeding in this fashion
means that the "wealth of experience" represented by American law
is not being systematically consulted and analyzed.18 4  It is, of
course, not binding on Canadian courts and, in fact, need not be
referred to at all. However, once the general value and relevance
of United States law has been recognized, however cautiously, it
ought not to be resorted to in a random fashion. The current
selective, almost eccentric, use of precedent tends to create the
misleading impression that the Court is either rejecting American
law that is too liberal or, at the very least, is doing no more for the
accused than the Americans do. In fact, in many cases where
United States law is cited peripherally or not at all, the Court is
doing more.
While only time and a detailed look at the workings of section
1 and the exclusionary rule in section 24(2) will tell, it may be that,
in the future, Canadians will no longer be able to point south and,
nodding their heads in approval or shaking them in disbelief, ponder
183 For example, the majority in Dyment, supra, note 33 may have foreseen the sort of
ruling recently made by the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench in R v. Pelletier (1989),
50 C.C.C. (3d) 22. See above, section III.B.1., supra at 760ff. In that case, the validity of the
new Criminal Code provisions authorizing the taking of blood samples for non-medical
purposes was at issue. Matheson, J. invoked section 1 to rule that, even if these sections run
afoul of Dyment, they constitute a reasonable limit upon the Charter rights they violate.
Interestingly, Schmerber, supra, note 64 was cited in support.
184 The phrase is Chief Justice Dickson's in Simmons, supra, note 20 at 312.
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the liberal rights accorded to accused persons in that country
85
Instead, Americans may look north with equally divided sentiments,
perhaps (dare we suggest it?), even citing Canadian precedent as
examples of enlightened progress or confused liberality. In any
event, there is no doubt that the Court, even more so than in the
period succeeding the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in 1949, is at last marching to its own
constitutional drummer. It remains to be seen how steady a beat
this is and whether American courts will take any notice.
185 However, cases such as Smith v. R (1989), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.), a decision
reported after the text of this paper had been written, suggest that retrenchment may have
already begun. In Smith, an accused who was arrested for a robbery committed some five
months earlier decided, due to the lateness of the hour, to wait until morning to call his
lawyer. He made it clear that he did not want to talk to the police without his lawyer present,
but relented and agreed to speak "off the record" when the police told him a lawyer would
just tell him not to talk and that he should set a good example to his children by being
honest. Distinguishing both Ross, supra, note 92 and Manninen, supra, note 21, a bare
majority (4:3) of the Court held that the duty to cease questioning was suspended by the
accused's lack of diligence, hence the right to counsel was not violated.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
APPENDIX I
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA CRIMINAL LAW CHARTER
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examples, see supra, note 27 and accompanying text at 731ff.
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APPENDIX II
LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE CANADIAN CHARTER
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Canadian Charter
Section 1
The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can






Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.
Section 8
No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process
of law.
Fourth Amendment
Everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure.
Section 9
Everyone has the right not to be
arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.
The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
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Section 10
Everyone has the right on arrest or
detention ...
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without
delay and to be informed of that right;
Section 11
Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.
Fifth Amendment
Any person charged with an offence has
the right ...
(c) not to be compelled to be a witness
in proceedings against that person in
respect of the offence;
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty according to law in a fair and
public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal;
No person ... shall be compelled in any




A witness who testifies in any proceeding
has the right not to have any
incriminating evidence so given used to
incriminate that witness in any other
proceedings, except in a prosecution for
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Section 24(2)
Where ... a court concludes that evidence
was obtained in a manner that infringed
or denied any right or freedoms
guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence
shall be excluded if it is established that,
having regard to all the circumstances,
the admission of it in the proceedings
would bring the administration of justice
of justice into disrepute.
Section 33
Legislative override allows Parliament or
legislature to enact legislation
notwithstanding that it may violate
sections 2 or sections 7 to 15 of the
Charter (paraphrase).
No counterpart.
No counterpart.
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